Credit Crunches, Asset Prices and Technological Change

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of a credit crunch in an economy where firms can retain a mature technology or adopt a new technology. We show that firms' collateral eases firms' access to credit and investment but can also inhibit firms' innovation. When this occurs, a contraction in the price of collateral assets squeezes collateral-poor firms out of the credit market but fosters the innovation of collateral-rich firms. The analysis reveals that the credit and asset market policies adopted during recent credit market crises can boost investment but slow down innovation. We find that the predictions of the model are consistent with the innovation patterns of a large sample of European firms during the 2008-2010 credit crisis.

Keywords: Credit Crunch, Technological Change, Collateral.
JEL Codes: E44; G21; G01.

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of a credit crunch in an economy where firms can retain a mature technology or adopt a new technology. We show that firms’ collateral eases firms’ access to credit and investment but can also inhibit firms’ innovation. When this occurs, a contraction in the price of collateral assets squeezes collateral-poor firms out of the credit market but fosters the innovation of collateral-rich firms. The analysis reveals that the credit and asset market policies adopted during recent credit market crises can boost investment but slow down innovation. We find that the predictions of the model are consistent with the innovation patterns of a large sample of European firms during the 2008-2010 credit crisis.

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1 Introduction

During the financial crisis that started in 2008, a major drop in the value of collateral assets, especially real estate, triggered a credit contraction, prompting firms to reduce their investments. The literature offers well-established arguments for interpreting these effects of a credit crunch. When entrepreneurs cannot commit to repay lenders, collateral eases their access to credit. Thus, aggregate shocks that erode collateral asset values depress total investment by hindering firms’ access to external finance (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Lorenzoni, 2008; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Den Haan, Ramey and Watson, 2003; Buera and Moll, 2015).

While useful to explain key transmission mechanisms of a credit market crisis, these arguments only yield partial insights into the effects of a credit crunch on technological change. Financial crises appear to have contrasting effects on technological change. The OECD (2009) reviews several pieces of evidence and concludes that credit market crises can certainly damage innovative firms but also be “times of industrial renewal”. Field (2011) documents that the Great Depression was a period of major innovations for the U.S. economy. These innovations ranged from Teflon in petrochemicals industries to household appliances, such as the radio and refrigerator, and formed the basis for the post-World War II economic expansion. In South Korea and in Finland, the number of innovative firms boomed during and in the immediate aftermath of the 1990s financial crises (OECD, 2009). And firm-level surveys reveal that while the credit crisis that started in 2008 depressed the innovation efforts of firms with difficult access to credit, such as young businesses with scarce collateralizable wealth, it also stimulated the innovation activity of other firms, especially more established businesses with more pledgeable assets and easier access to credit (see, e.g., Hall, 2011; European Commission, 2012; Voigt and Moncada-Paternò-Castello, 2009; Cincera,

1Ex post, after entrepreneurs default, lenders can repossess collateral and this compensates for the limited pledgeability of entrepreneurs’ output; ex ante, lenders’ threat to repossess collateral deters entrepreneurs’ misbehavior.

2Further back in history, the Long Depression started in 1873 was marked by the introduction of major innovations.
Cozza, Tübke and Voigt, 2012, and references therein). In Section 2, we will uncover evidence in support of these conclusions by exploring survey data on the innovation activity of about 15,000 European firms during the 2008-2009 credit crisis. The results will suggest that, while the majority of firms responded to the 2008-2009 credit crunch and drop in collateral asset prices by postponing innovation, a non-negligible number of firms responded to shrinking credit and collateral values by investing in innovation. Such firms were concentrated in the segment of businesses with large pledgeable assets, whereas firms with little collateral assets scaled down their innovation activity.

These observations elicit fundamental questions: Can we build a model economy that captures these contrasting effects of credit market crises on innovation? In such an economy, under what conditions does a credit crunch triggered by a drop in collateral values depress or stimulate innovation? And what policies are more innovation-friendly during a credit crunch? This paper takes a step towards addressing these questions. Building on the above observations, we focus on the innovation propensity within incumbent businesses that rely on collateral-based funding. We posit an economy where entrepreneurs operate a mature technology or innovate and adopt a new technology. Lenders, in turn, acquire information that is essential for repossessing and liquidating productive assets pledged as collateral when entrepreneurs default (as in Diamond and Rajan, 2001, for example). Lenders’ information on collateral assets eases entrepreneurs’ access to credit but can make lenders reluctant to finance entrepreneurs’ innovation. In fact, the assets of the new technology are more illiquid and firm specific and, hence, less pledgeable as collateral than the assets of the mature technology. Furthermore, lenders’ information on the assets of the mature technology is (partially) specific and non-transferable to the assets of the new technology. Therefore, expecting that the information they have accumulated on mature collateral assets will go wasted if entrepreneurs switch to the new technology, lenders may hinder entrepreneurs’ innovation efforts.

The distribution of firms across collateral values replicates salient features of that obtained in previous general equilibrium models of the credit market (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Collateral-poor firms lack access to credit because they cannot pledge enough expected returns to lenders. Firms with medium and rich collateral assets, instead, obtain credit. The novelty consists of firms’ technology adoption. When lenders’ technological inertia arises, while firms with a medium value of collateral potentially innovate, collateral-rich firms retain the mature technology. In fact, their lenders expect a large depreciation in the value of their information if the mature technology is abandoned in favor of the new technology.

We study the effects of a contraction in the price of collateral assets (e.g., as in Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Following a drop in the asset price, marginal firms with collateral assets just sufficient to obtain credit are squeezed out of the credit market because they can no longer pledge enough expected returns to lenders. This tends to reduce total investment and innovation. Consider next collateral-rich firms. The asset price drop erodes the value of the information acquired by their lenders on mature collateral assets, mitigating lenders’ potential technological inertia. This can foster the innovation of collateral-rich firms. Overall, while the asset price drop depresses total investment, its impact on innovation depends on the relative magnitudes of the drop in the innovation of firms squeezed out of the credit market and the increase in the innovation of collateral-rich firms.\(^3\)

The analysis delivers novel policy implications. We investigate the effects of two unconventional policies implemented by central banks and governments during the recent credit crisis: an intervention in the collateral asset market aimed at bolstering the asset price and a policy of direct lending

\(^3\)In the paper, we characterize conditions under which an asset price drop is more likely to trigger an increase in innovation. For example, we relate the likelihood of this scenario to the verifiability of the output of projects and to the probability of project success.
to collateral-poor firms. We find that both policies boost total investment but may dampen the increase in the innovation of collateral-rich firms after the shock. Notably, the asset market policy turns out to be more taxing for innovators than the direct lending policy.

In the last part of the paper, we revisit the mechanisms of the model under richer structures of the credit sector and the corporate sector. The goal is to assess under what structures of the credit and corporate sectors a credit crunch is more likely to depress or stimulate innovation. In the credit sector, we allow for information-intensive credit relationships between firms and lenders in which lenders obtain more information on firms’ collateral assets (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). We find that, following a contraction in the price of collateral assets, the increase in the innovation of collateral-rich firms can entail a reduction in the number of credit relationships. In turn, this can dampen the stimulus to output triggered by innovation. In the corporate sector, we allow for managerial firms and managers’ technological inertia due to higher riskiness of the new technology. We then investigate how managers’ inertia interacts with lenders’ potential technological inertia.

This paper especially relates to two strands of literature. The first strand investigates the impact of a disruption in the financial structure on aggregate investment (e.g., Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, 2015). In this literature, we borrow some properties of our modelling strategy, such as the focus on a finite horizon economy, from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Other related papers in this literature include Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2003), Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2001), Buera and Moll (2015) and Catherine, Chaney, Huang, Sraer and Thesmar (2017). Buera and Moll (2015) study the effects of a tightening of collateral constraints on investment wedges in a model with credit frictions and heterogeneous firms. Catherine et al. (2017) structurally estimate the impact on investment and output of collateral shocks in a model with heterogeneous firms. While in these studies a credit tightening depresses investment, in our economy it depresses investment but may foster technological change.

The second related strand of literature analyzes the impact of recessions on firms’ innovation through the credit market (e.g., Caballero and Hammour, 2005; Ramey, 2004; Garcia-Macia, 2017; Wang, 2017). Caballero and Hammour (2005) show that, because of credit frictions, production units can be destroyed at an excessive rate during a recession and the subsequent recovery can occur more through a slowdown in the destruction rate than through an increase in the creation rate. Ramey (2004) shows that if financial managers have empire-building incentives, during downturns they can discard efficient projects to preserve the size of their portfolios. This paper puts forward a view opposite to these studies: while it depresses investment, a credit tightening can mitigate lenders’ technological inertia. In this regard, our analysis shares some features with the Shumpeterian view of recessions as moments of creative destruction. For example, in Caballero and Hammour (1994) during recessions innovative production units can more easily enter and displace outdated ones. However, we do not focus on the innovations of newly formed start-ups, but rather on changes in the innovation propensity within incumbent businesses, showing how changes in the value of their collateral assets can alter the incentives of their lenders to support innovation. Accordingly, we focus on collateralized lending by financial institutions, rather than early-stage private equity or growth funding. Recent studies in this literature focus increasingly on the design of effective policies for promoting innovation. Garcia-Macia (2017) investigates an economy where heterogeneous firms invest in physical and intangible capital. Intangible capital is harder to seize by creditors and hence incurs into higher financing costs. In a financial crisis, these costs rise and the resulting fall in intangible investment amplifies the crisis. Garcia-Macia (2017) finds that a policy of transfers conditional on firm age may speed up the recovery from a crisis more than credit sub-

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4Gilchrist, Sim and Zakraj (2014) quantify the output loss due to misallocation of credit across firms. See also Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2017).
sidies. Wang (2017) studies R&D investment and knowledge capital accumulation in an economy with credit frictions. Unlike physical capital, knowledge capital cannot be pledged as collateral. Wang (2017) shows that firms with initially high knowledge capital engage in precautionary savings to raise their collateralizable financial assets. He also examines the impact of industrial policies, finding that tax credits for R&D investment can boost output more than policies that encourage the use of intellectual property as collateral.

The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we provide background evidence for key mechanisms of the model. In Section 3, we present the baseline model. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium. In Section 5, we conduct experiments aimed at mimicking a credit market crisis. Section 6 considers policies. Section 7 studies extensions while Section 8 concludes. Appendix A contains additional details on the data and the empirical analysis while Appendix B contains the main proofs (baseline model, Sections 3-5). Further details of the derivations and additional results are relegated to the online Supplement.

2 Empirical Background

As noted, various pieces of evidence point to a possible role of credit market crises in stimulating the start of innovative plans by established firms with large pledgeable collateral, while depressing the access to credit and the innovative plans of collateral-poor firms. To gain further intuition, in this section we exploit information from a large survey of European firms conducted in 2010 with reference to the years 2007-2009. Our data source is the EU-EFIGE data set, collected as part of the EFIGE project (European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness) supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commission and coordinated by the Bruegel Institute. The survey targets a representative sample at the country level of almost 15,000 manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees in seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom). The data set includes quantitative and qualitative information on firms’ R&D, innovation, labor organization, financing and organizational activities. Questions related to the behavior of firms during the 2008-2010 financial crisis were also included in the survey. We complement the EFIGE data set with firms’ balance-sheet information from the BvD-Amadeus database.

The EFIGE data set is ideally suited for our purposes. First, it surveys firms in European countries generally characterized by a strong importance of banking sectors in firm financing. Second, it covers the period of the credit market crisis that started in 2008. The seven countries covered by the EFIGE survey experienced a sizeable credit crunch from 2008 to 2009, with the average credit to non-financial businesses dropping by about 1.2% in real terms from the last quarter of 2008 to the last quarter of 2009 (source: BIS, Credit to the Non-Financial Sector, section on non-financial firms). Third, one of the main goals of the survey was to investigate firms’ response to deteriorating credit market conditions from 2008 to 2009. Thus, the survey questionnaire explicitly asked the firms whether from 2008 to 2009 they increased or decreased their activities on a number of relevant margins. Importantly for our purposes, firms’ innovation activity is one of the margins investigated by the survey. Using the survey questions on innovation, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm declares that in 2008-2009 it engaged in innovations that resulted in products and product features that were innovative with respect to products existing in the market. We label this indicator variable “engagement in innovations in 2008-2009”. We also construct an alternative variable using a somewhat stricter definition: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the dummy “engagement in innovations in 2008-2009” takes the value of one and in addition the firm declares that in 2008-2009 it did not postpone innovation plans and
that it actually expanded its range of products (signalling non-marginal innovations). We label this second indicator variable “start or acceleration of non-marginal innovations in 2008-2009”. In addition, our data provide rich information on the availability of collateralizable assets as well as details on banks’ lending technologies, including banks’ emphasis on firms’ collateral when granting credit (see Appendix A for more details on the variables).

Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is useful to check the relevance of external financing for firms’ innovation activities. The survey asks the firms the percentage of funding for investments that comes from internal funds, intragroup financing, venture capital, bank credit, public funding, leasing and factoring, or other. It also asks the firms whether the composition of funding for innovation activities and R&D is the same as for investments broadly meant. In line with figures from the literature (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2001), the firms declare that the percentage of bank funding for investments approximately equals 26.5%, versus slightly more than 50% of internal financing. Around two thirds of the firms declare that the share of bank funding for innovation activities and R&D is the same as for other investments. When we consider firms with below the median size (employees) the share of bank funding for investments approximately equals 30% (with around two thirds declaring the same relevance for innovation and R&D funding). These figures indicate that a substantial share of funding for innovation activities does not come from internal financing and, in particular, that bank credit is an important source of funding for such activities.

In Table 1, we use the information provided by the EFGE data set in two ways. In Panel A, we explore whether during the credit market crisis (2008-2009) there were significant differences between firms that invested in innovation and firms that instead postponed their innovation plans. Unsurprisingly, the panel reveals that during the credit crunch about 85% of the firms postponed innovation plans. Yet, about 15% of the firms in the sample declare that during the credit crunch they instead started or accelerated non-marginal innovation plans. Importantly for our purposes, the panel shows that such firms were of similar size and age as the firms that postponed innovation but exhibited a significantly larger availability of collateralizable assets, especially fixed assets easily pledgeable as collateral. Panel A further suggests that during the crisis banks’ emphasis on collateral tended to be associated with a drop in the innovation activity of firms with little pledgeable assets but with some increase in the propensity to innovate of firms with large pledgeable assets. Finally, the panel indicates stronger importance of credit relationships for innovative firms than for firms that postponed innovation.

While the 2008-2009 credit crunch was pervasive, some firms suffered from its effects more than others. Further, our theoretical analysis stresses the impact of a drop in the value of collateralizable assets. In Panel B of Table 1, we then dig deeper into the data and test whether the firms that during the 2008-2009 credit crunch experienced a contraction in the value of their fixed, pledgeable assets exhibited a tendency to invest in innovation or to postpone innovation plans. Again, our main interest is whether firms with larger initial collateral responded differently to a drop in the value of their pledgeable fixed assets, investing in innovation rather than postponing innovation (see the interaction term in the regressions). We saturate all the probit regressions in Panel B with a full set of country and two-digit industry dummies and in columns 5-8 we further include various firm-level controls, such as proxies for firm size, age and labor productivity (the inclusion of these controls entails a loss of observations). The results in the panel reveal that during the crisis the firms with little assets that experienced a contraction in the value of fixed assets did not engage in innovations and indeed postponed innovation plans following such a contraction. By contrast, the firms with initially large assets responded to a contraction in the value of fixed assets by engaging in innovations and actually starting or accelerating non-marginal innovation plans. For example, in column 1 the estimated coefficient on the change in the value of fixed assets is positive and
Table 1: European Firms’ Innovation during the 2008-2009 Credit Market Crisis

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of firms</th>
<th>Firm age (years)</th>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Total assets (thousands euros)</th>
<th>Fixed assets (thousands euros)</th>
<th>Collateral (Tot. as. &gt; median)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Start or Accl. Non-Marginal Innov. From 2008 to 2009</td>
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<td>35.541</td>
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<td>8119</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>2912</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postpone Innovations from 2009 to 2009</td>
<td>12986</td>
<td>34.323</td>
<td>129.817</td>
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<td>5838</td>
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Panel (A) Summary Statistics (means) for Non-marginal Innovation Plans during the 2008-2009 Credit Crunch

Panel (B) Innovation Response to Change in Value of Fixed Assets during the 2008-2009 Credit Crunch

Engage in Innovations in 2008-2009

Start or accelerate Non-marginal Innovations in 2008-2009

Note: This table examines the innovation patterns of firms from seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Hungary) during the 2008-2009 credit crisis. Panel A reports the number of firms that started/accelerated or postponed non-marginal innovation plans during the 2008-2009 credit crunch and summary statistics (means) for the two categories of firms. The summary statistics refer to general firms’ demographics (firm age and employees), pledgeable collateral assets (total assets and fixed assets), banks’ emphasis on collateral, banks’ involvement in investment financing, and proxies for relationship lending (duration of main credit relationship). Panel B, columns 1-10, report the effect of the growth rate of the value of fixed assets on the decision to start or accelerate non-marginal innovation plans in 2008-2009. In the regressions, “tot ass.>median” is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm’s total assets exceed the median. All regressions in Panel B include country and industry dummies. In columns S-5 labor productivity is value added per worker. See Appendix A for more details on variables and data. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
equal to 0.064 while the interaction term with the dummy for larger-than-median assets is negative and equal to -0.112. In column 2, the estimated coefficient on the change in fixed assets is again positive (equalling 0.061) while the coefficients on the interaction terms with the dummies for the 3rd and 4th asset quartiles are significantly negative (and equal to -0.095 and -0.124, respectively). These findings are confirmed when we reestimate the regressions for different subsamples based on firms’ initial asset value, rather than inserting interaction terms (see, e.g., columns 3-4 and 13-14). Further, in columns 9-10 we reestimate the regression in column 1 separately for firms that declare that their banks are significantly involved in the financing of the firm’s investments and for firms for which banks have little involvement. We find that, for firms with initially large assets, the tendency to innovate in response to a drop in fixed assets manifested itself especially when their banks where significantly involved in investment financing (compare the interaction terms in columns 9 and 10).

Consistent with the evidence mentioned in Section 1 and with the conclusions of OECD (2009), the results in Table 1 thus suggest that during the 2008-2009 European credit crisis, while the majority of firms responded to the contraction in credit and collateral values by scaling down their innovation plans, a non-negligible share of firms responded by investing in innovation. Such firms were concentrated in the segment of businesses with relatively large availability of assets pledgeable as collateral.

2.1 Robustness

We conduct several tests to verify the robustness of the findings in Table 1. To conserve space, we present the robustness tests in the Appendix Tables A.1-A.2. The reader could wonder whether firms with large availability of collateralizable assets have also a large stock of outstanding debt. If that were the case, the size of total assets or fixed assets of a firm might not reflect accurately the availability of assets pledgeable to financiers. In a first set of robustness tests we then experiment by adding the firm’s leverage as a control (where leverage is total liabilities over total assets). The results remain virtually unaffected and leverage appears to have no (or at most limited) power in explaining firms’ innovation decisions (Table A.1, columns 1-5). To further control for outstanding debt obligations that could reduce collateral asset availability, in columns 6 and 7 of Table A.1 we also insert the ratio of bank debt over the total liabilities of the firm and the ratio of short-term bank debt over total liabilities. Bank debt is generally collateralized while corporate bonds are not; moreover, short-term debt often entails more stringent debt obligations than long-term debt. The results are robust to including these further controls for firms’ debt obligations.5

The reader might also wonder whether in the baseline regressions of Table 1 the effect of assets on innovation reflects the availability of internal cash. In columns 8-17 of Table A.1, we include two proxies of cash availability: the firm’s cash flow in 2008 (columns 8-12) and the firm’s liquidity ratio, defined as the stock of cash and cash equivalents over total assets in 2008 (columns 13-17). The results remain essentially unaltered and the proxies for cash availability are generally insignificant.

Firms’ innovation decisions can be dictated by expectations about the net profit of the business. While we cannot directly observe such expectations, in Table A.2, Panel C, we include a measure of the firm’s profitability in the years of the sample, the firm’s return on assets (ROA). The results remain virtually unchanged whether we control for the firm’s ROA in 2008 (columns 7-11) or the average ROA over 2008 and 2009 (not tabulated). And columns 12-13 show that the results remain unchanged after controlling for an additional proxy of firm labor productivity, the number of skilled blue collar workers of the firm.6

5Supplementary Table S.3 also contains the estimates obtained after controlling for banks’ emphasis on collateral.
6In untabulated tests, we also experimented with other proxies for the human capital of the firm.
A possible further concern could be that there is some reverse causality from innovation to collateral asset availability. In our context, we do not expect the start or acceleration of innovation plans during the crisis period to directly influence the stock of collateral with which a firm enters the period. However, to further assuage lingering doubts, we experiment by using a measure of collateral availability which is driven by the inherent technological characteristics of the firm’s industry. In particular, we employ the sectorial measure of asset tangibility constructed by Braun (2005). In Panel A of Table A.2, columns 1-2, we then reestimate the regressions by inserting this measure of asset tangibility interacted with the change in the firm’s fixed assets. The results are consistent with those obtained in Table 1 using total assets: for firms with higher asset tangibility, a contraction in fixed assets promotes innovation.7

In Panel B of Table A.2, columns 3-6, we experiment with an alternative definition of the dependent variable. To further narrow down the firms that started or accelerated innovation plans during 2008-2009, we code a dummy that equals one if the indicator variable “start or acceleration of non-marginal innovations” takes the value of one and, on top of this, the firm applied for a patent in 2008-2009 or purchased foreign R&D and engineering services. Using this definition yields almost identical insights.

Finally, the reader might wonder whether during the crisis firms with limited collateral and tight financial and profitability conditions engaged in a “gamble for resurrection behavior” by undertaking risky but potentially profitable innovations. If that were the case, some of these firms could have failed during the crisis, exiting the sample. While we lack information on such potential sample dropouts, we can carry out two tests that provide some evidence regarding the presence of a gambling for resurrection behavior in our sample. In columns 14-18 of Table A.2, employing a propensity score matching model, we test whether indeed the impact of the treatment (collateral availability) on innovation decisions does not reflect riskiness, profitability, or default probability of the firm. In particular, we estimate the determinants of innovation in a sample of matched firms above and below the median total asset value and that feature similar profiles of riskiness (Z-score),8 profitability, age, industry, and country. Matched firms were selected in two alternative ways: (i) without replacement using all matching firms within the predefined propensity score distance (caliper) $\delta = 0.001$ and (ii) using the control firm with the closest propensity score (nearest neighbor), without resampling or distance restrictions. With both methods, the results obtained in this matched sample appear to be virtually identical to those in the full sample.9

A second way in which we can detect the presence of “gambling for resurrection” is to verify whether firms in our sample on the verge of distress at the onset of the crisis and that chose to innovate during the crisis exhibited higher propensity to fail in the following years. Matching information on firm exit from the Orbis and Amadeus databases to the firms in our sample, we then constructed a proxy for firm exit taking the value of one if the firm exited in 2010 or 2011 (“exit by 2011”); we also constructed an indicators for exit in 2010-2012 (“exit by 2012”). Next, we verified to what extent these proxies for exit correlate with innovation activities for firms with signs of distress at the onset of the crisis (firms with total assets below the median, firms with ROA below the median and, in line with Altman et al., 1977, firms with a Z-score below a cutoff (1.8) which is reputed to be a sign of incipient distress). Supplementary Table S.4 gathers a wide range of correlations. We find no evidence that firms on the verge of distress at the onset of the crisis exhibited a positive correlation between innovation and propensity to exit in 2010, 2011 and

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7 As an alternative check, we also considered the measure of asset redeployability in Kim and Kung (2017), obtaining similar results.
8 The Z-score for non-listed firms is constructed as in Altman et al. (1977) and following studies.
9 In columns 14-18 we display the estimates obtained with the first method.
2012 (if anything, we find negative, though not significant, correlations between innovation and our proxy for exit). These conclusions hold up when we regress the indicator for exit on innovation and on sector and country fixed effects. And similar insights are obtained if we replace the proxy for exit with an indicator of distress after the crisis, the firm’s solvency ratio. Thus, it does not appear that distressed firms that innovated during the crisis had a higher propensity to fail in the following years.

3 The Baseline Model

This section describes a general equilibrium model of the credit market where firms exhibit heterogeneous availability of collateralizable assets. Firms can retain a mature technology or potentially adopt a new technology. We then explore the impact on firms’ innovation of shocks to collateral asset values and the implications of policy interventions. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events while Table 2 summarizes the notation of the model.

3.1 Agents, goods, and technology

Consider a three-date economy \( t = 1, 2, 3 \) populated by a unit continuum of entrepreneurial firms and a continuum of investors of measure larger than one. There is a final consumption good, which can be produced and stored, and productive assets of two vintages, mature and new. Entrepreneurs have no endowment while each investor is initially endowed with an amount \( \omega \) of final good. All agents are risk neutral and consume on date 3.

Each entrepreneur can carry out one indivisible project that requires an investment \( i < \omega \) of final good. On date 1, an entrepreneur can choose an innovative plan for his project that can generate an innovation opportunity on date 2. If the innovative plan is chosen and the innovation opportunity arises, the entrepreneur adopts a new technology. Otherwise, the entrepreneur has to retain a mature, less productive technology. Under the mature (new) technology, on date 3 the entrepreneur transforms an amount \( i \) of final good into one unit of mature (new) assets. With probability \( \pi \) the project succeeds and the mature (new) assets yield an output \( y(1+n) \) of final good; otherwise the project fails and the entrepreneur goes out of business.

In case of failure, a fraction \( \mu a \) of assets can be recovered and redeployed outside the firm. \( a \) captures the amount of collateralizable assets of an entrepreneur and is uniformly distributed across entrepreneurs over the domain \([0, 1]\). \( \mu \) reflects the effort the entrepreneur exerts for the maintenance of the collateralizable assets. This maintenance can be thought as acquiring information on the collateral assets and their market or also as restraining from looting and asset depreciation.\(^{10}\) We specify a simple technology for the maintenance of collateral assets: an entrepreneur sustains a per-unit effort cost of \( \frac{\mu^2}{2} \) for achieving a level \( \mu \) of maintenance.

On date 3, each entrepreneur still in business can reuse one unit of liquidated assets, obtaining an amount \( \eta \tilde{y} \) of final good. \( \tilde{y} \) is an idiosyncratic output with a positive mass on zero. The expected value of \( \tilde{y} \) is \( \theta \), which is uniformly distributed across entrepreneurs over the domain \([0, \theta]\); \( \eta \) represents the aggregate productivity of liquidated assets.\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\)Different classes of models focus on various activities of collateral asset maintenance and preservation and we do not restrict attention to one particular interpretation. A broad empirical literature shows that borrowers’ actions can significantly impair or enhance the actual liquidation value of collateral (see, e.g., Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess, 2017, Udell, 2004, ILO, 2001, and references therein). In macroeconomic settings, firms are often assumed to engage in activities of capital repair (see, e.g., Gertler and Karadi, 2011).

\(^{11}\)The heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ ability to reuse assets generates a downward sloping asset demand.
Figure 1: Decisions of entrepreneurs and lenders. The bottom of the tree shows the repayments to the lender in the event of project success.

3.2 Credit sector

Each entrepreneur can enter a credit contract with one investor on date 1. Following an established literature, we allow the lender to exert some control over the entrepreneur’s production opportunities (see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Rajan, 1992). Precisely, consider the case in which the entrepreneur has chosen an innovative plan for his project. On date 2, the lender can carry out a costless action that affects the probability of the innovation opportunity: if she carries out this action, the opportunity will arise with probability $1 - \sigma^A$; otherwise, the opportunity will arise with a lower probability $1 - \sigma^A_{\bar{A}}$ (where $0 < \sigma^A < \sigma^A_{\bar{A}} < 1$).

The lender also acquires information on assets as a by-product of her financing activity. As in Diamond and Rajan (2001) and Habib and Jonsen (1999), this enables her (unlike other agents) to obtain value from the liquidation of the entrepreneur’s assets. Precisely, the liquidation value the lender recovers in the event of project failure and liquidation of the mature technology is $p\mu_a$, where $p$ denotes the asset price; the rest is lost in the form of transaction costs. To capture the idea that the lender has instead lower ability to acquire experience about the assets of a new technology, we assume that the lender recovers less value from new assets than from mature assets (we normalize to zero what she obtains in case of liquidation of the new technology).

3.3 Contractual structure

As in Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), a lender cannot contractually commit to carry out her action that facilitates (increases the probability of) the innovation opportunity because the action is non-verifiable; similarly, the level of collateral maintenance performed

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12 Throughout, unless otherwise stated, we let transaction costs be transfers rather than a real resource loss. This is without loss of generality.

13 As discussed in Section 7.3, and shown in the Supplement, the results carry through with alternative specifications. In the Supplement, we consider an alternative case in which the lender has control over the success probability of projects (Section C.1 of the Supplement) and a case in which the lender has partial ability to liquidate the assets of the new technology (Section B.3). We also study alternative settings where the new technology has a higher or a lower success probability than the mature technology (Sections B.1 and B.2).
Table 2: Notation of the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of project success</td>
<td>$\pi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output of mature technology</td>
<td>$y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity edge of new technology</td>
<td>$n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral assets of firm</td>
<td>$a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment outlay of project</td>
<td>$i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of verifiable output</td>
<td>$l$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of innovation opportunity if lender facilitates</td>
<td>$1 - \sigma^A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of innovation opportunity if lender hinders</td>
<td>$1 - \overline{\sigma}^A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate productivity liquidated assets</td>
<td>$\eta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idiosyncratic productivity liquidated assets</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lender’s bargaining power in renegotiation</td>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance cost of collaterals</td>
<td>$\zeta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lender’s endowment</td>
<td>$\omega$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table describes the parameters and exogenous variables of the model.

by an entrepreneur is not verifiable in courts, implying that no contract can be written upon it. Imperfect enforceability also limits agents’ commitment to pecuniary transfers and, hence, the design of pecuniary incentives for the lender. Specifically, in the event of project success, only a fraction $l$ of the output is verifiable while the rest accrues privately to the entrepreneur. In the event of project failure and asset liquidation, the lender cannot commit the specific liquidation skills tied to her information about the assets. Thus, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001), she can threaten to withhold her skills during the liquidation, forcing a renegotiation of the allocation of the liquidation proceeds. We denote by $\lambda$ the bargaining power of the lender in the renegotiation.

Given this contractual structure, on date 1 the contract between a lender and an entrepreneur specifies a loan amount of $i$ and the repayment to the lender in the event of project success, contingent on the technology adopted. Precisely, if the entrepreneur does not choose an innovative plan, the contract specifies the repayment $r_m^I$ if the mature technology is successfully operated; if the entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan, the contract specifies the repayment $r_n^I(r_n^I)$, if the mature (new) technology is successfully operated. Since on date 1 there is perfect competition among investors, the contract maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return subject to the entrepreneur’s limited liability constraints $r_m^I, r_m^I \leq l\, y$, $r_n^I \leq l(1 + n)\, y$, and the relevant constraints of the lender. These include the lender’s participation constraint and the lender’s incentive constraint if the entrepreneur wants to incentivize the lender to carry out the action that facilitates innovation.

3.4 Discussion

In the real sector, the difference between the two technologies is that the new technology produces more output ($y(1 + n) > y$) but its assets have lower liquidation value ($\mu_npa < \mu pa$, where for

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14 Since assets purchased in the liquidation market have zero output with positive probability, an entrepreneur is unable to commit such liquidation output to a lender, on top of the output of his project. This feature captures in a reduced form the difficulty to contractually pledge output from distant and unrelated activities.

15 We do not impose a limited liability constraint for the lender. Implicitly, we are assuming that the lender has more than enough funds to make transfers to the entrepreneur on date 3, if needed. Adding a limited liability constraint would not alter the results.
simplicity we have set $\mu_n = 0$. The assets that embody new technologies and R&D results are likely to be firm specific and illiquid, thus having little collateral value (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hall and Khan, 2003; Berlin and Butler, 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Garcia-Macia, 2017; Wang, 2017). Moreover, lenders typically have less experience in liquidating new vintages of assets than mature ones.

In the credit sector, two features are worth discussion: the control exerted by a lender and the characterization of information as asset liquidation skills. We share with Aghion and Bolton (1992), Rajan (1992), and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), for example, the assumption that a lender carries out an interim action that affects production opportunities. This action has several real world counterparts. In an R&D race, it can consist of concealing the findings of the entrepreneur’s internal research from his competitors (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995); it can consist of providing the entrepreneur with advice or information for expanding the firm’s technological frontier; if the lender has representatives on the board of the firm, as in the case of German and Japanese banks, it can consist of voting for an innovative strategy. In other circumstances, it can consist of a refinancing (Rajan, 1992): the need for refinancing is likely for a new technology which generally yields little interim cash flow, especially at the R&D stage (Goodakre and Tonks, 1995). Aghion and Bolton (1992) discuss examples of other actions of lenders which can affect innovation opportunities, such as supporting firms’ mergers and spin-offs.

We borrow the characterization of information as asset liquidation skills from Diamond and Rajan (2001) and Habib and Johnsen (1999). The critical feature is that the lender acquires more information than the entrepreneur and the other investors. As for the latter, following Diamond and Rajan (2001), our assumption reflects the idea that the lender gathers more information on assets through her financing activity. As for the former, “Because he [the entrepreneur] is a specialist at maximizing the value of the asset in its primary use [...] it is reasonable to assume that he lacks the skill even to identify the asset’s next best use or to recognize clearly the occurrence of the bad states” (Habib and Johnsen, 1999, p. 145).

## 4 Equilibrium

We solve the model in steps. First, we take the asset price as given and study the problems of lenders and entrepreneurs. We solve for the date-2 choice of collateral asset maintenance by an entrepreneur. We then solve for a lender’s choice $\alpha \in \{A, \overline{A}\}$ between action ($A$) and inaction ($\overline{A}$) on date 2, and her choice whether to finance an entrepreneur. We next solve for the date 1 choice of an entrepreneur whether to engage in an innovative plan and her choice of contract.

### 4.1 Entrepreneurs’ collateral maintenance

When choosing the level of maintenance of the collateral assets, an entrepreneur maximizes

$$E(\mu) - \frac{\zeta \mu^2}{2} pa$$

where $E(\mu)$ denotes the return that the entrepreneur expects to appropriate in case of liquidation of the mature assets. Lemma 1 characterizes the decision of collateral maintenance. The lemma shows that the maintenance effort increases as the probability of operating the mature technology increases (and therefore the probability of innovation declines).

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16 $\mu$ is an endogenous choice by entrepreneurs. It is positive in equilibrium, as the next section shows. In the Supplement (Section B.3), we consider a case in which new assets have positive liquidation value, though lower than that of mature assets. The results carry through.
Lemma 1 (Collateral maintenance). (i) If an entrepreneur adopts an innovative plan \((I)\), and the lender takes the action that facilitates innovation \((A)\), the collateral maintenance effort is
\[\mu_{IA} = \frac{(1-\pi)(1-\lambda)\sigma_A}{\zeta}.\]

(ii) If an entrepreneur adopts an innovative plan \((I)\), while the lender chooses inaction \((\bar{A})\), the maintenance effort is
\[\mu_{I\bar{A}} = \frac{(1-\pi)(1-\lambda)\sigma_{\bar{A}}}{\zeta}.\]

(iii) If an entrepreneur does not adopt an innovative plan \((\bar{I})\), the maintenance effort is
\[\mu_{\bar{I}} = \frac{(1-\pi)(1-\lambda)}{\zeta}.\]

As \(\sigma_A < \sigma_{\bar{A}} < 1\), \(\mu_{IA} < \mu_{I\bar{A}} < \mu_{\bar{I}}\).

4.2 Lenders

Let us consider the case in which an entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan on date 1 and let us study the date 2 decision of his lender whether to carry out the action that facilitates innovation. The lender compares her expected return if she facilitates innovation with her expected return if she hinders it. Assuming that she breaks a tie in favour of innovation, she will carry out the action if and only if
\[ (1 - \sigma^A)\pi r^I_n + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r^I_m + \lambda(1-\pi)\mu_{IA} \right] \geq (1 - \sigma^A)\pi r^I_m + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r^I_m + \lambda(1-\pi)\mu_{I\bar{A}} \right].\]

Using the solution of \(\mu_{IA}\) and \(\mu_{I\bar{A}}\), the above inequality can be rewritten as
\[ r^I_n - r^I_m \geq \frac{(\sigma^A + \sigma^A)(1-\pi)^2\lambda(1-\lambda)pa}{\pi \zeta}. \] (1)

Inequality (1) is the lender’s incentive constraint. The left hand side is the spread between the repayments in the event of successful adoption of the new technology and in the event of successful adoption of the mature one. The right hand side captures the reduction in the expected asset liquidation proceeds that the lender suffers if she facilitates innovation. This reduction, due to the lender’s worse ability to liquidate new assets, is positively related to the liquidation value \(pa\) of mature assets. The lender will facilitate innovation if and only if, as in (1), the contract guarantees her a sufficiently higher repayment if the new technology is successfully adopted, compensating the reduction in her expected liquidation proceeds.

Lemma 2 (Credit for innovation). Conditional on that an entrepreneur adopts an innovative plan, there exists a feasible contract that induces a lender to carry out the action for innovation if and only if the entrepreneur’s collateral assets satisfy
\[ a \in [a_{IA}(p), \bar{a}(p)], \]
where:
\[ a_{IA}(p) = \frac{\zeta [i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2(1-\pi)^2\lambda(1-\lambda)p}, \] (2)

and
\[ \bar{a}(p) = \frac{\zeta [\pi ly(1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1-\pi)^2\lambda(1-\lambda)p}. \] (3)
The intuition is as follows. The spread $r_n^I - r_m^I$ that can be set in a contract is bounded. In fact, the repayment $r_n^I$ for the new technology is constrained above by the entrepreneur’s limited liability constraint. And, for a given $r_n^I$, the repayment $r_m^I$ for the mature technology is constrained below by the lender’s participation constraint. Lemma 2 shows that if $a > a(p)$, in (1) the left hand side falls short of the right hand side for any feasible pair $(r_n^I, r_m^I)$. In this region, the lender hinders innovation. Inspection of (3) reveals that a lender is more likely to hinder innovation when the maintenance cost $\zeta$ on the assets is lower, when the entrepreneur is rich in collateral assets (has a high $a$), and when the asset price $p$ is higher. Intuitively, a lender loses more from the depreciation of her asset liquidation skills when the entrepreneur’s collateral maintenance is higher and the asset value $pa$ is higher. Turning to the lower bound $a^{IA}(p)$, this stems from the fact that collateral-poor firms ($a < a^{IA}(p)$) cannot satisfy a lender’s participation constraint and are thus excluded from the credit market. Inspection of (2) reveals that a lender is more likely to provide credit when the maintenance cost $\zeta$ on the assets is lower, when an entrepreneur is rich in collateral assets, and when the asset price is higher. Lemma 2 thus illustrates the dual role of collateral. On the one hand, collateral eases the access to credit. On the other hand, an excess of collateral hinders innovation.

When the lender does not take the action for innovation or when the entrepreneur does not adopt an innovative plan, the lender may still provide credit as long as the entrepreneur has enough collateral assets. Lemma 3 characterizes the lower bound of collateral assets $a$ for the lender to extend credit in these scenarios.

**Lemma 3** (Credit under no innovation). *If an entrepreneur adopts an innovative plan but the lender hinders innovation, the lender is willing to provide credit if and only if the collateral assets satisfy $a \geq a^{IA}(p)$, where

$$a^{IA}(p) = \frac{\zeta[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2(1 - \pi)^2(1 - \lambda)p}.$$

If an entrepreneur does not adopt an innovative plan, the lender is willing to provide credit if and only if the collateral assets satisfy $a \geq a^I(p)$, where

$$a^I(p) = \frac{\zeta(i - \pi ly)}{(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p}.$$

We make the following parametric assumptions:

A1: $\frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + \frac{n}{1 + \sigma^A},$

A2: $\frac{i}{\pi ly} > 1 + n - \sigma^A n.$

**Lemma 4.** Under assumption A1, $a^{IA}(p) < a^{IA}(p) < a(p)$, and $a^{IA}(p) < a^I(p) < a(p)$. Under assumption A2, $a^{IA}(p) > 0$.

Lemma 4 states that if the lender refuses to provide credit when an innovative plan is adopted and she facilitates innovation ($a < a^{IA}(p)$), the lender will also refuse to provide credit when the entrepreneur does not adopt an innovative plan ($a < a^{IA}(p)$) or when the lender hinders innovation ($a < a^I(p)$).

The measure of entrepreneurs who obtain credit and the measure of entrepreneurs whose lenders facilitate innovation depend on the asset price $p$. For instance, if $p$ is too low, we can have $a^{IA}(p) >
1, in which case no entrepreneur will obtain credit. Below, when studying the equilibrium asset price, we will characterize the conditions under which such degenerate cases do not occur. Until then, we will reason conditionally. For instance, Lemma 2 states that, conditional on \( a \) being in the interval \( [a^{IA}(p), \bar{a}(p)] \), innovation is feasible.

### 4.3 Entrepreneurs’ innovation decision

Let us now examine entrepreneurs’ decisions. Given Lemmas 3 and 4, entrepreneurs with \( a < a^{IA}(p) \) do not have access to credit. The following lemma characterizes decisions for firms with \( a > a^{IA}(p) \).

**Lemma 5** (Innovation decision). Assume that \( l < \frac{2A}{1+\lambda} \) and that assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Let \( a > a^{IA}(p) \).

(i) If \( \frac{i}{\pi y} \leq 1 + n - \frac{2\lambda n\sigma A \bar{A}}{l(1+\lambda)(1+\sigma A)} \), there exists \( a^{IA}(p) \equiv \frac{2\bar{\pi}ny}{(1-\pi)l(1+\lambda)(1+\sigma A)p} \leq \bar{a}(p) \) such that an entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \in [a^{IA}(p), \bar{a}(p)] \) and chooses not to innovate if \( a > a^{IA}(p) \).

(ii) If \( 1 + n - \frac{2\lambda n\sigma A \bar{A}}{l(1+\lambda)(1+\sigma A)} \leq \frac{i}{\pi y} < 1 + n - \frac{2\lambda n\sigma A \bar{A}}{l(1+\lambda)(1+\sigma A)} \), an entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \in [a^{IA}(p), \bar{a}(p)] \) and chooses not to innovate if \( a > \bar{a}(p) \).

(iii) If \( 1 + n - \frac{2\lambda n\sigma A \bar{A}}{l(1+\lambda)(1+\sigma A)} \geq \frac{i}{\pi y} \), there exists \( a^{IA}(p) \equiv \frac{2\bar{\pi}ny}{(1-\pi)l(1+\lambda)(1+\sigma A)p} \geq \bar{a}(p) \) such that an entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \in [a^{IA}(p), a^{IA}(p)] \) and chooses not to innovate if \( a > a^{IA}(p) \).

In cases (i)-(iii), conditional on the lender facilitating (hindering) innovation, an entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \leq a^{IA}(p) \) \((a > a^{IA}(p))\). These cases capture scenarios where some entrepreneurs can deliberately choose not to innovate because the expected return from the mature technology dominates that of the new technology. Observe that cases (i) and (iii) have an empty intersection with assumptions A1 and A2 if \( \frac{\sigma A(1+\sigma A)}{1+\sigma A} < \frac{l(1+\lambda)}{2A} < \frac{\sigma A}{1+\sigma A} \). We impose this assumption, thus restricting attention to interesting scenarios in which every entrepreneur is willing to innovate if his lender takes the action that facilitates innovation.\(^{17}\)

### 4.4 Asset price and firm distribution

We now solve for the asset price.\(^{18}\) There always exists a degenerate equilibrium in which the asset price is zero.\(^{19}\) We are interested in non-degenerate equilibria in which the price is positive. The demand \( D(p) \) for liquidated assets satisfies

\[
D(p) = \left[1 - a^{IA}(p)\right] \bar{\pi} \left(1 - \frac{p}{\eta \bar{\theta}}\right).
\]

A measure \( 1 - a^{IA}(p) \) of entrepreneurs obtain credit and become active. Moreover, a share \( \pi \) of active entrepreneurs remain in business. Finally, a share \( (\eta \bar{\theta} - p) / \eta \bar{\theta} \) of the entrepreneurs still in

\(^{17}\)The restriction on the parameters is intuitive. For example, regarding \( l \), when the output verifiability \( (l) \) is not too high, it is hard to induce the lender to carry out the action for the innovation. Thus, whenever it is possible to induce the lender to facilitate the innovation, the entrepreneur prefers innovating. On the other hand, when the output verifiability \( (l) \) is not too low, it is relatively easy to induce the lender to carry out the action for the innovation. Thus, when the lender has no incentive to facilitate innovation, the entrepreneur prefers not to innovate.

\(^{18}\)We focus on the asset market clearing. In the credit market, investors’ supply of funds is infinitely elastic at an expected return of one. In fact, investors are risk neutral and can store their endowment instead of lending it.

\(^{19}\)This degenerate equilibrium is the result of a coordination failure. If entrepreneurs and lenders believe that the asset price is zero, no project will be funded. This will lead to a zero demand and a zero supply of assets.
business recover an output no lower than $p$ from reusing assets. The supply of asset $S(p)$ satisfies

$$S(p) = (1 - \pi) \int_{a^{IA}(p)}^{1} ada.$$  

This is given by the probability $1 - \pi$ that an entrepreneur fails times the amount of assets $a$ liquidated by a failed entrepreneur, integrated across the active entrepreneurs.

The asset demand is increasing in the probability $\pi$ of project success (entrepreneurs still in business can reuse liquidated assets) while the supply is decreasing in $\pi$ (liquidated assets come from failed entrepreneurs). Therefore, the lower $\pi$, the lower the net asset demand and the asset price. If the price is too low, it may cause $a^{IA}(p)$ to exceed one, completely shutting down entrepreneurs’ access to credit. Thus, $\pi$ cannot be too low. For a similar reason, the upper bound $\eta \bar{\sigma}$ on entrepreneurs’ ability to reuse assets cannot be too low. Overall, we need to assume\textsuperscript{20}

$$A3: \eta \bar{\sigma} \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) > \frac{\pi \zeta}{2} \left[ i - \pi ly (1 + n - \sigma^An) \right].$$

Lemma 6 solves for the equilibrium price.

**Lemma 6 (Collateral asset price).** Consider the region of parameters where assumptions A1-A3 hold. There exists a unique equilibrium with positive asset demand and supply. In this equilibrium, the asset price is given by

$$p^* = \frac{\eta \bar{\sigma}}{2\pi} \left\{ 3\pi - 1 \right\} + \left[ \left( \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} \right)^2 - \frac{2\pi \zeta}{\eta \bar{\sigma}} \left[ i - \pi ly (1 + n - \sigma^An) \right] \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}. \tag{4}$$

Proposition 1 characterizes the distribution of firms across collateral values.

**Proposition 1 (Firm distribution).** Consider the region of parameters where assumptions A1-A3 hold. (i) If

$$\eta \bar{\sigma} \leq \frac{\zeta ly(1+n) - i}{\sigma^A(1-\pi)^2 \lambda(1-\lambda)} \left[ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2\pi} - \frac{(1-\pi)\sigma^A i - \pi ly (1 + n - \sigma^An)}{2\pi \sigma^A \lambda ly(1+n) - i} \right]^{-1}, \tag{5}$$

no firm with collateral $a < a^{IA}(p^*)$ has access to credit, and all firms with collateral $a > a^{IA}(p^*)$ have access to credit and potentially innovate.

(ii) If (5) does not hold, no firm with collateral $a < a^{IA}(p^*)$ has access to credit, all firms with collateral $a \in [a^{IA}(p^*), \bar{a}(p^*)]$ have access to credit and potentially innovate, and all firms with collateral $a > \bar{a}(p^*)$ have access to credit but do not innovate.

Case (i) in Proposition 1 shows that, if the equilibrium asset price is low (say, because $\eta \bar{\sigma}$ is relatively small), then all firms with access to credit potentially innovate. In fact, as noted, lenders hinder the adoption of the new technology only when the collateral asset value is not too low. Figure 2 instead displays the distribution of firms in the case in which the asset price is not too low and $\pi(p^*) < 1$, that is, case (ii) in Proposition 1. This is the interesting case in which a positive measure of collateral-rich firms face lenders’ technological inertia and do not innovate.

\textsuperscript{20}The particular lower bound on $\pi$ we obtain ($\pi > \frac{1}{2}$) is driven by our assumptions on the distribution of collateral assets ($a \sim U[0,1]$) and on the distribution of entrepreneurs’ ability to reuse assets ($\theta \sim U[0,\bar{\sigma}]$). We chose these distributions for tractability. However, it should be clear that a lower bound constraint on $\pi$ applies more generally.
5 Credit Crisis Experiments

We study the effects of a collateral squeeze as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) (see also the capital quality shock in Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Precisely, we consider a drop in the aggregate productivity $\eta$ of liquidated assets and assume that the drop is small so we can evaluate its effects using differential calculus. In practice, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), for example, we perform comparative statics exercises, comparing the equilibrium for different values of $\eta$. Throughout, we consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, which occurs in the region of parameters defined in (ii) of Proposition 1 and which is represented in Figure 2, lenders can engage in technological inertia. In the second, which occurs in the region of parameters defined in (i) of Proposition 1, lenders do not engage in technological inertia and all firms with access to credit potentially innovate.

In the credit sector, we focus on the effect on the measure of firms obtaining credit,

$$C = 1 - a^{IA}(p^*)$$.

In the real sector, we focus on the effect on the asset price $p^*$, total investment $I = iC$, the measure of innovative firms

$$N = \min \{C, \pi(p^*) - a^{IA}(p^*)\},$$

and output $Y$.

Proposition 2 (Collateral squeeze and innovation). Consider the region of parameters in which assumptions A1-A3 hold. A collateral squeeze (reduction of $\eta$) reduces the asset price, total investment, and the measure of firms with access to credit. Moreover,

(i) If (5) holds, the collateral squeeze reduces the measure of innovative firms; if (5) does not hold, it increases the measure of innovative firms.

(ii) If (5) holds, the collateral squeeze reduces output; if (5) does not hold, it reduces output if and only if

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial \eta} (\pi y - i) + \pi \frac{\partial \left( C \int_{\theta}^{\eta} \frac{\partial}{\theta} d\theta \right)}{\partial \eta} > -\frac{\partial N}{\partial \eta} \pi (1 - \sigma A) ny.$$

The drop in the productivity $\eta$ of assets induces a fall of the asset price because the demand for liquidated assets shrinks. The measure of firms with access to credit falls with the asset price. In particular, the firms that were “marginal” in the credit market (with collateral assets in the neighborhood of $a^{IA}(p^*)$) are denied credit because they can no longer pledge enough expected returns to a lender. These firms drop out of the credit market and their investment is lost. Their exclusion from the credit market further reduces the net asset demand and feeds back on the asset price. This effect is similar to that in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).

The new prediction regards collateral-rich firms in the scenario in which lenders’ technological inertia arises (case (ii) in Proposition 1). Since the threshold $\pi(p^*)$ above which collateral-rich firms face lenders’ technological inertia is negatively related to the asset price, the collateral squeeze induces firms in the neighborhood of $\pi(p^*)$ to potentially innovate. The assumption of a uniform
distribution of collateral values implies that the measure of additional collateral-rich firms that potentially innovate outweighs the measure of firms that drop out of the credit market, so the total measure of innovative firms increases. Of course, with a generic distribution, whether the total measure of innovative firms increases or decreases depends on the relative size of these two groups of firms. However, the message of the paper is that in a credit crunch there can be a positive effect on innovation that contrasts with the traditional effect due to tight credit. Notably, in general equilibrium the exclusion of some firms from the credit market is beneficial for the innovation of collateral-rich firms. In fact, when some firms become inactive, the net asset demand drops. This further depresses the asset price, and, given the negative relationship between $\bar{\sigma}(p^*)$ and $p^*$, it fosters the innovation of collateral-rich firms. This will be crucial for evaluating the impact of policies that sustain the access of collateral-poor firms to credit. Turning to the effect on output, in the scenario with lenders’ technological inertia this effect reflects the competition between two opposite forces: the investment drop due to the exclusion of some firms from the credit market and the increase of innovation of collateral-rich firms.

While the model does not aim at providing a quantitative assessment, in the Supplement we present some numerical experiments. These experiments help illustrate conditions under which a collateral squeeze can indeed stimulate innovation, that is, condition (5) does not hold (case (ii) in Proposition 1). They also help illustrate conditions under which the effects of a collateral squeeze are larger. We relegate details to the Supplement and summarize here the main points. It can be shown that the scenario in which the measure of innovative firms grows after a collateral squeeze is more likely when the output verifiability $l$, the probability of project success $\pi$, and the output edge of the new technology $n$ are lower. Intuitively, in all these cases firms are more exposed to lenders’ technological inertia and hence a drop in collateral asset values is more likely to relax lenders’ inertia and boost innovation. Moreover, in all these cases, conditional on the measure of innovative firms increasing after the shock, the effect of the shock on the measure of innovative firms is larger. Intuitively, since lenders’ technological inertia is tighter to start with, the impact on innovation of the asset price drop and of the resulting relaxation in lenders’ inertia is larger.  

6 Credit Policies

During the recent financial crisis, central banks and governments (including the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury as well as the ECB and various European governments) engaged in two unconventional credit policies. First, they intervened in asset markets to sustain asset prices – for instance, by purchasing mortgage-backed securities. Second, they directly granted loans to firms and non-bank financial institutions to finance asset holdings at margin requirements lower than those of financial institutions. We are going to see that a consequence of these policies could be that while, as intended, they boost investment, they also tend to freeze the stimulus to innovation triggered by a credit crunch.

Before proceeding, it is useful to compare the decentralized equilibrium with the allocation that would be chosen by a social planner. Lemma 7 shows that in the decentralized equilibrium the measures of active firms and of innovative firms are suboptimally low.

\[\text{\#1:\#2}\]

\footnotesize{Interestingly, in the numerical experiments a lower bargaining power $\lambda$ of lenders makes more likely the scenario in which the measure of innovative firms grows after the collateral squeeze. However, conditional on this scenario occurring, a lower bargaining power of lenders reduces the positive impact of the shock on the measure of innovative firms. In the case of $\lambda$ two effects compete with each other. A lower $\lambda$ reduces lenders’ appropriation of collateral value but also boosts entrepreneurs appropriation and, hence, entrepreneurs’ collateral maintenance effort.}
Lemma 7 (Social optimum). A social planner would choose an allocation in which more entrepreneurs obtain credit than in the decentralized equilibrium. All funded entrepreneurs would choose innovative plans.

In the social planner’s problem, a positive measure of firms with \( a < a^{IA}(p^*) \) would invest. However, it is not necessarily the case that the planner would want all entrepreneurs to invest, because entrepreneurs with a low value \( a \) provide few assets for other entrepreneurs to reuse and produce output. Therefore, they may have a negative social value.

We can think of the asset market policy as consisting of the government subsidizing asset purchases on date 3. Precisely, we posit that the government makes a transfer \( \tau \) of final good to each entrepreneur who purchases one unit of liquidated assets. The government can finance these subsidies by levying non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxes. For example, on date 3 it may tax investors’ revenues, regardless of whether these originate from storage, from loan repayment or from asset liquidation; alternatively, it may tax the output of collateral-rich entrepreneurs without distorting agents’ decisions. Since the subsidy affects the asset demand and the equilibrium asset price (see the Appendix), assumption A3 needs to be rewritten as

\[
A3(\tau) : \eta \bar{\theta} \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) > \frac{\pi}{2} \left[ \frac{\zeta [i - \pi ly (1 + n - \sigma^A n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)} - \tau \right].
\]

Note that A3 implies A3(\( \tau \)) for any positive \( \tau \). Proposition 3 illustrates the effects of the asset market policy. Again, we contrast the scenario in which lenders’ technological inertia arises for collateral-rich firms (case (ii)) with the scenario in which lenders’ inertia does not arise (case (i)).

Proposition 3 (Asset market policy). Consider the region of parameters in which assumptions A1, A2, and A3(\( \tau \)) hold. An increase of the transfer \( \tau \) boosts the asset price and total investment. Moreover, (i) If

\[
\eta \bar{\theta} \leq \left[ \frac{\zeta [\pi ly (1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A \lambda (1 - \lambda)} - \tau \right]^{-1},
\]

an increase of the transfer raises the measure of innovative firms and output; (ii) If (7) does not hold, an increase of the transfer reduces the measure of innovative firms. The increase in transfer increases output if

\[
\frac{\partial C}{\partial \tau} (\pi y - i) + \pi \left( C \int_{\frac{\pi - \tau}{\pi}}^{\frac{\pi - \tau}{\frac{\pi - \tau}{\pi}}} \frac{\partial C}{\partial \bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial \bar{\theta}}{\partial \tau} \right) > -\frac{\partial N}{\partial \tau} \pi (1 - \sigma^A) ny.
\]

The second policy consists of the government directly lending to firms at margin requirements lower than private lenders. We assume that the government grants credit to firms with \( a \in [a_G, a^{IA}(p)] \), where the policy tool is now the \( a_G \) threshold. Similar to the first policy, the government finances any loss by levying lump-sum taxes. As above, assumption A3 needs to be rewritten to account for the new price level:

\[
A3(a_G) : \eta \bar{\theta} \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) > \frac{\zeta [i - \pi ly (1 + n - \sigma^A n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \frac{(2\pi - 1)\pi}{3\pi - 1 - (1 - \pi) a_G}.
\]

Note that A3 implies A3(\( a_G \)) for any \( a_G < 1 \). Proposition 4 studies the effects of direct lending.
Proposition 4 (Direct lending). Consider the region of parameters in which assumptions A1, A2, and A3(\(a_G\)) hold. A decrease of \(a_G\) boosts the asset price and total investment. Moreover, (i) If

\[
\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\bar{\theta}} \leq \frac{\zeta [\pi y (1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda) 3 \pi - 1 - (1 - \pi) a_G},
\]

a decrease of \(a_G\) raises the measure of innovative firms and increases output; (ii) If (9) does not hold, a decrease of \(a_G\) increases the measure of innovative firms and output if

\[
\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\bar{\theta}} \geq \frac{\zeta [\pi y (1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda) [3 \pi - 1 - (1 - \pi) a_G]^2}.
\]

Otherwise, a decrease of \(a_G\) reduces the measure of innovative firms; it increases output if

\[
\frac{\partial C}{\partial a_G} (\pi y - i) + \pi \frac{\partial \left( C \int \eta \theta \udging{d\theta} \right)}{\partial a_G} < -\frac{\partial N}{\partial a_G} \pi (1 - \sigma^A) n y.
\]

The policy of subsidies boosts the asset price, easing the access of collateral-poor firms to credit. However, a higher asset price reduces the collateral threshold above which lenders hinder innovation. Similarly, the direct lending policy promotes the access of collateral-poor firms to credit but, since in general equilibrium this increases the asset demand and the asset price, it reduces the collateral threshold above which lenders hinder innovation. However, unlike in the case of subsidies, the direct lending policy directly promotes the access of collateral-poor firms to credit while it exerts an upward pressure on the asset price indirectly. Thus, its chilling effect on innovation is only a possibility, that is, the direct lending policy is more innovation-friendly than the policy of subsidies. This conclusion also emerges in the numerical experiments presented in the Supplement, which show that the direct lending policy is more successful in raising both the measure of firms with access to credit and the measure of innovative firms.

7 Extensions

In what follows, we extend the baseline model to richer structures of the credit and corporate sectors. Our goal is to understand what structures of the credit and corporate sectors are more conducive to the mechanisms investigated in the baseline model and, hence, under what structures credit crunches are more likely to depress or stimulate firms’ innovation. In the credit sector, we introduce credit relationships. A growing strand of literature finds beneficial effects of credit relationships during credit crunches (see, e.g., Beck, Degryse, De Haas and van Horen, 2018). Thus, it is natural to examine how credit relationships would affect the collateral channel of innovation isolated in the baseline model. In the corporate sector, we consider managerial firms and examine a form of managers’ technological inertia and its interaction with lenders’ inertia.

7.1 Credit relationships

Entrepreneurs can establish information-intensive credit relationships with lenders or seek transactional loans with little information content (Berger and Udell, 2002).\footnote{For evidence, see, e.g., Guiso and Minetti (2010).} We now account for this and show that the innovation of collateral-rich firms following a collateral squeeze can entail their switch from relationship to transactional funding. In turn, this may involve an output cost.
In this extension, we posit that there is a date 0 when each entrepreneur chooses whether to establish an information-intensive relationship with his financier on date 1 or seek a transactional loan. Under relationship finance the asset liquidation value achieved for a given collateral maintenance cost is higher, capturing the idea that a relationship lender can acquire better information about the collateral and its market and also help avoid collateral asset depreciation (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). This will enhance the asset liquidation value. Formally, we let the cost for collateral maintenance be lower when an entrepreneur chooses to have a relationship lender (\(\zeta = \zeta^R\)) than when he chooses to have a a transactional lender (\(\zeta = \zeta^T\)). Therefore, we now also need to solve for an entrepreneur’s funding choice \(\zeta \in \{\zeta^R, \zeta^T\}\). The trade-off is immediate. A relationship lender allows to achieve a higher liquidation value of mature assets. Thus, she can offer cheaper financing and also grant credit to entrepreneurs that would not be funded by a transactional lender (\(a^{IAR}(p) < a^{IAT}(p)\)). However, a transactional lender is more willing to facilitate innovation because, extracting less value from mature assets, she loses less collateral asset value in case of adoption of the new technology (\(\pi^T(p) > \pi^R(p)\)).

Throughout, we maintain the assumptions of the baseline model, with the caveat that they hold for \(\zeta \in \{\zeta^R, \zeta^T\}\). The analysis for extreme collateral values is trivial. Collateral-poor firms with \(a < a^{IAR}(p)\) cannot obtain credit, even if they choose relationship funding. Collateral-rich firms with \(a > \pi^T(p)\) cannot innovate, even if they choose transactional funding. Since relationship funding is cheaper, they choose \(\zeta = \zeta^R\). The non-trivial case occurs for firms with intermediate collateral assets (\(a \in [a^{IAR}(p), \pi^T(p)]\)). For those among them with \(a \in [a^{IAR}(p), \pi^R(p)]\) relationship funding is innovation-friendly and cheaper. Firms with \(a \in (\pi^R(p), \pi^T(p)]\) face instead a non-trivial choice: transactional funding facilitates innovation but it is more expensive. Specifically, there are two possible cases. In the first case, \(a^{IAT}(p) > \pi^R(p)\) so some firms with \(a \in (\pi^R(p), \pi^T(p)]\) cannot obtain credit if they want to innovate under transactional funding. We examine this possibility in supplementary analysis (available from the authors). In the second case, \(a^{IAT}(p) \leq \pi^R(p)\) so all firms with \(a \in (\pi^R(p), \pi^T(p)]\) can obtain credit if they choose to innovate under transactional funding. Here, we restrict attention to this case by assuming

\[
A4: \frac{i}{\pi ly} \leq 1 + \left[ \frac{1}{1 + \sigma A} \left( \frac{\sigma^A \zeta^T - \zeta^R}{\sigma^A \zeta^T + \sigma^A \zeta^R} \right) (\sigma^A)^2 \right]^n.
\]

Note that A4 implies A1 if and only if \(\sigma^A \geq \zeta^T/\zeta^R\). Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of firms. Lemma 8 solves for an entrepreneur’s funding choice. For expositional simplicity, we focus here on the interesting scenario in which a positive measure of collateral-rich firms do not innovate under relationship funding, i.e., \(\pi^R(p) < 1 ((5) evaluated at \(\zeta = \zeta^R\) does not hold).

**Lemma 8** (Funding choice). An entrepreneur chooses transactional funding if and only if \(a \in (\pi^R(p), \pi^T(p)]\) and \(a \leq \frac{2 \zeta^R C^T (1 - \sigma A)}{(1 - \pi)^2 (1 - \lambda^2) [\zeta^T - \zeta^R (\sigma A)]^2} \equiv \hat{a}(p)\).

Lemma 8 identifies two credit regimes. In the first, which arises when \(\hat{a}(p) \leq \pi^R(p)\), no entrepreneur chooses transactional funding. We label it “relationship finance” regime. This arises when relationship lenders hinder only the innovation of firms with very large collateral or when relationship funding is much cheaper. In the second regime, which arises when \(\hat{a}(p) > \pi^R(p)\), entrepreneurs with intermediate collateral avoid the technological inertia of relationship lenders by choosing transactional funding. We label it “mixed finance” regime. This arises when relationship lenders are very inclined to technological inertia or when their cost advantage is small. In both regimes, collateral-rich firms form credit relationships in which they retain the mature technology.
Lemma 9 characterizes the regions of parameters in which the two regimes arise.

**Lemma 9 (Credit regimes).** Credit regimes are characterized by two thresholds

\[ l = \frac{2\lambda (1 - \sigma^A) \sigma^A \zeta^T}{(1 + \lambda) [\zeta^T - \zeta^R (\sigma^A)^2]}, \]

\[ \bar{l} = \min \left\{ \frac{2\lambda \left[ 1 - (\sigma^A)^2 \right] \sigma^A \zeta^T}{(1 + \lambda) [\zeta^T - \zeta^R (\sigma^A)^2]}, \frac{2\lambda (1 - \sigma^A) \left( \sigma^A \zeta^T + \sigma^A \zeta^R \right)}{(1 + \lambda) [\zeta^T - \zeta^R (\sigma^A)^2]} \right\}. \]

If \( l \leq \bar{l} \) mixed finance is the only regime; if \( l \geq \bar{l} \), relationship finance is the only regime. If \( l \in (l, \bar{l}) \), the relationship finance regime occurs if \( \frac{i_y}{\pi_y} \leq 1 + n - \frac{\sigma^A n l}{\bar{a}(p)} \), and the mixed regime occurs otherwise.

Proposition 5 describes the distribution of firms in the two credit regimes. The proof is immediate given Lemmas 8 and 9.

**Proposition 5 (Firm distribution).** In the region of parameters consistent with the relationship regime, firm distribution is as in the baseline model (Proposition 1), with \( \zeta = \zeta^R \). In the region consistent with the mixed regime, firms (i) have no access to credit iff \( a < \tilde{a}^{IAR}(p) \), (ii) choose relationship funding and potentially innovate iff \( a \in [\tilde{a}^{IAR}(p), \tilde{a}^R(p)] \), (iii) choose transactional funding and potentially innovate iff \( a \in (\tilde{a}^R(p), \min \{\tilde{a}(p), \tilde{a}^T(p)\}) \), (iv) choose relationship funding and do not innovate iff \( a > \min \{\tilde{a}(p), \tilde{a}^T(p)\} \).

We now study the effects of a collateral squeeze.

**Proposition 6 (Collateral squeeze, credit regimes, and innovation).** In both credit regimes, a collateral squeeze (reduction of \( \eta \)) reduces the asset price, total investment, and the measure of firms with access to credit while it increases the measure of innovative firms and has an ambiguous effect on output. In the mixed regime, it induces firms with collateral assets in the neighborhood of \( \min \{\tilde{a}(p^*), \tilde{a}^T(p^*)\} \) to innovate by switching from relationship to transactional funding.
In the relationship finance regime, collateral-rich firms innovate within their credit relationships. In the mixed regime, instead, since \( \min \{ \hat{a}(p^t), \pi^T(p^t) \} \) is negatively related to the asset price, after the drop in \( \eta \) collateral-rich firms innovate by switching to transactional funding. This can have implications for output. In fact, since the recovery value of collateral assets is higher within credit relationships, the switch to transactional funding increases liquidation costs. If these costs are assumed to be at least partially a real resource loss, this adds to the effects on output of the investment decline and of the increase in innovation.

**Discussion.** One may argue that some types of lenders, though at a disadvantage in liquidating collateral assets (like the transactional lenders in the above extension), have the ability to boost the success probability of innovations. This might be the case for venture capitalists, which allegedly have less experience on mature, established technologies but have also special expertise in acquiring information about new technologies and asset vintages. Although, as noted, our model does not focus on venture capital finance, we could capture this scenario by assuming that for transactional lenders \( \zeta^T > \zeta^R \) and \( \sigma^{AT} < \sigma^{AR} \). The analysis and results are similar to the case with only \( \zeta^T > \zeta^R \). Higher probability of innovation further reduces entrepreneurs’ collateral maintenance when they borrow from transactional lenders, as collateral assets are less likely to be useful. The rankings \( \hat{a}^{IAR}(p) < \hat{a}^{IAT}(p) \) and \( \hat{a}^R(p) < \hat{a}^T(p) \) are further reinforced. Therefore, under an assumption similar to A4, we again obtain the rankings of thresholds \( \hat{a}^{IAR}(p) < \hat{a}^{IAT}(p) < \hat{a}^R(p) < \hat{a}^T(p) \).

The entrepreneurs make decisions on which lender to borrow from and whether to adopt an innovative plan. Again, collateral-poor firms with \( a < \hat{a}^{IAR}(p) \) cannot obtain credit, even if they choose relationship funding; collateral-rich firms with \( a > \pi^T(p) \) cannot innovate, even if they choose transactional funding. Since relationship funding is cheaper, they choose to borrow from relationship lenders. Firms with \( a \in (\hat{a}^{IAT}(p), \hat{a}^{IAR}(p)) \) can only borrow from relationship lenders and innovate. Firms with \( a \in [\hat{a}^{IAT}(p), \hat{a}^R(p)] \) can borrow from both types of lenders and innovate. The trade-off is that relationship lenders induce lower innovation probability but also lower maintenance costs of mature assets. Assuming that the advantage of lower maintenance cost dominates, firms with \( a \in [\hat{a}^{IAT}(p), \hat{a}^R(p)] \) would all choose relationship lenders. Firms with \( a \in (\hat{a}^R(p), \hat{a}^T(p)) \) face the choice between transactional lenders that facilitate innovation versus relationship lenders that hinder innovation. Similar as in Lemma 8, either the mixed finance regime or the relationship finance regime could occur.

### 7.2 Managerial firms

In the baseline model, we have considered entrepreneurial firms. In this section, we extend the baseline model to managerial firms and investigate the interaction between lenders’ inertia and a form of technological inertia inside borrowing firms. The source of borrowers’ inertia is the higher risk of failure that the new technology can entail relative to the mature technology.

We model technological inertia inside borrowing firms building on the extant literature on agency conflicts in managerial firms (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, for a discussion). We now posit that the economy is also populated by a continuum of managers of measure larger than one. Managers have no endowment and have the same utility as entrepreneurs and investors. In a firm the implementation of a project now requires a manager, who faces an effort (or an opportunity) cost \( e \) for working for the firm. On date 2, the manager can carry out a non-verifiable costless action that facilitates innovation: if the manager and the lender both take actions, then the probability of innovation increases from \( 1 - \sigma^A \) to \( 1 - \sigma^A \). To highlight managers’ aversion to innovation due to higher riskiness of the new technology, we now let the success probability \( \pi_n \) of

\[23\] \text{We assume that } \sigma^{AT} = \sigma^{AR} = \sigma^A \text{, so the probability of innovation is the same when lenders do not take actions.}
the new technology be lower than the success probability $\pi$ of the mature one (though, consistent with the baseline model, $\pi_ny(1+n) > \pi y$).

A manager’s compensation package comprises a wage $w$ if the project succeeds and the firm remains in business, plus a possible bonus $w_n$ in the event the new technology is successfully adopted. In case of project failure, the manager loses his job and obtains zero. With a flat compensation (i.e., $w > 0$, $w_n = 0$), the manager would prefer retaining the mature technology with its higher success probability in order to minimize the risk of losing his job. To prevent this, the entrepreneur needs to pledge part of the higher output of the new technology as a bonus ($w_n > 0$) to the manager. Assuming that he breaks a tie in favor of innovation, the incentive constraint under which the manager prefers facilitating the new technology reads

\[(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n(w + w_n) + \sigma^A \pi w \geq (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n(w + w_n) + \sigma^A \pi w, \tag{10}\]

or, rearranging,

\[w_n \geq \frac{(\pi - \pi_n)}{\pi_n} w. \tag{11}\]

The manager’s bonus reduces the output pledgeable to the lender in case of successful adoption of the new technology. Thus, the entrepreneur now faces a tension between the need to incentivize the lender and the need to incentivize the manager. Lemma 10 solves for the collateral asset threshold below which a firm has no access to credit and the threshold above which a firm does not innovate. The lemma compares these thresholds with those in the absence of managers’ moral hazard (for example, if managers worked for firms but did not affect innovation).

**Lemma 10 (Managers’ and lenders’ inertia).** There exists a feasible contract that induces both a lender and a manager to facilitate innovation if and only if the entrepreneur’s collateral assets satisfy $a \in [\overline{\alpha}^{IA}(p), \overline{\alpha}(p)]$, where

\[\overline{\alpha}^{IA}(p) = \frac{\zeta[i + e - (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_ny(1 + n)y - \sigma^A \pi ly]}{(\sigma^A)^2(1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)p},\]

\[\overline{\alpha}(p) = \frac{\zeta[\pi_nly(1 + n) - e - i]}{\sigma^A(1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)p} ,\]

Absent managers’ moral hazard, the threshold above which firms do not innovate would equal

\[\overline{\alpha}''(p) = \frac{\zeta[\pi_nly(1 + n) - (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n + \sigma^A \pi - i]}{\sigma^A(1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)p} > \overline{\alpha}'(p), \tag{12}\]

while the threshold below which firms do not obtain credit would equal $\overline{\alpha}^{IA}(p) = \overline{\alpha}''(p)$.

Henceforth, we maintain assumptions analogous to A1-A3 to guarantee that in this extended environment a positive measure of firms (but not all firms) obtain credit ($0 < \overline{\alpha}^{IA}(p) < 1$) and that a positive measure of funded firms potentially innovate ($\overline{\alpha}^{IA}(p) < \overline{\alpha}'(p)$).

Lemma 10 shows that, for a given asset price, the region of collateral values in which technological inertia arises is now larger ($\overline{\alpha}'(p) < \overline{\alpha}''(p)$). In particular, an entrepreneur with $a > \overline{\alpha}'(p)$ cannot simultaneously satisfy the lender’s and the manager’s incentive constraints, so that either the lender or the manager do not have the incentive to facilitate the innovation. To complete the analysis, however, we need to account for the general equilibrium effects through the asset price.
Proposition 7 (Firms’ innovation). The measure of innovative firms is lower in the presence of managers’ moral hazard than in its absence.

As shown in Lemma 10, in this extended environment in which both lenders and managers can engage in technological inertia the measure of innovative firms tends to be lower. Since the new technology succeeds with a lower probability ($\pi_n < \pi$), this implies that a larger measure of firms remain in business and a smaller measure of firms fail. The resulting higher net demand for liquidated assets induces a higher asset price, further exacerbating technological inertia (remember that $\tilde{\pi}(p)$ is negatively related to $p$). Thus, there is both a direct negative effect and an indirect, general equilibrium negative effect (through asset prices) on the measure of innovative firms.

It is immediate that the results on the effects of a collateral squeeze (drop in $\eta$) carry through to this extended environment. Moreover, a given drop in the asset price boosts the measure of innovative firms more than in the baseline model (see the proof of Proposition 7).

7.3 Other extensions

In the Supplement of the paper, we present other extensions and robustness checks of the baseline results. First, we study the effects of a drop in the probability of success of projects, rather than the effects of a collateral squeeze. We then investigate a scenario in which lenders exert control over the success probability of projects, rather than exerting control over the probability of innovation opportunities. Finally, we examine the case in which the success probability of the new technology is higher or lower than the success probability of the mature one. We show that in these various alternative scenarios the baseline results of the analysis carry through, with opportune revisitations of the parametric assumptions. Indeed, in the Supplement we show that agents’ decisions are the same as in the baseline model, when parameters are chosen in a specific way. We refer the reader to the Supplement for more details.

8 Conclusion

This paper has studied a credit crunch triggered by a drop in collateral asset values in an economy where firms can adopt new technologies or retain less productive technologies. In our economy, lenders hinder the innovation of collateral-rich firms to preserve the value of their information on mature technologies. By depressing the price of collateral assets, a negative collateral shock squeezes collateral-poor firms out of the credit market but fosters the innovation of collateral-rich firms. The analysis reveals that credit and asset market policies such as those implemented during the recent credit crisis promote investment but may slow down innovation.

The paper leaves important questions open for future research. First, while the model can help disentangle the effects of a credit crunch on technological change, it cannot offer predictions on their magnitude. A priority is to cast the analysis into a dynamic general equilibrium environment and study the quantitative relevance of the effects. Second, in our economy, following negative collateral shocks collateral-poor firms lose access to credit while collateral-rich firms switch to more productive technologies. Thus, the cross-sectional dispersion of innovation increases. Interestingly, this is reminiscent of the finding of Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten and Terry (2018) that during recessions the cross-sectional dispersion of output rises. An objective for future research is to dig deeper into the cross-sectional effects of a credit crunch on innovation and output.

24 We also show robustness to assuming that the lender has partial ability to liquidate the assets of the new technology.
References


Appendix A

This Appendix A contains: i) details on data sources and definitions for the empirical analysis; ii) Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 for the empirical analysis.

Data Sources and Definitions

The data collection for EFIGE was performed through a survey carried out by a professional contractor. The questionnaire covers six areas: firm ownership structure; workforce characteristics; investment, technological innovation, R&D (and related financing); export and internationalization; market structure and competition; financial structure and bank-firm relationships. To ensure statistical representativeness, the data set was built so as to fulfill two main criteria. First, the availability of an adequately large target sample of firms, initially set at around 3,000 firms for large countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), and about 500 firms for smaller countries (Austria and Hungary). Second, a proper stratification of the sample to ensure representativeness of the collected data ex ante and ex post for each country, considering in particular three dimensions: sector composition, regions and size classes.

The EFIGE survey provides information on innovation activities and on the impact of the financial crisis on such activities. For measuring innovation activities, we use and combine information from three questions: 1) During 2009, has your firm decided to postpone investments in innovation? (Yes/No); 2) Always referring to the last year (2009), the range of products that your firm
has decided to offer has (relative to past years): (a) Been widened; (b) Remained the same; (c) Been reduced; 3) On average in the last three years did the firm carry out product innovation, that is, introduction of a good which is either new or significantly improved with respect to its fundamental characteristics (the innovation should be new to the market)? (Yes/No).

Starting from these questions, we construct two variables: “engagement in innovations in 2008-2009” is a dummy equal to one if the firm answers Yes to question 3), zero otherwise; “start or acceleration of non-marginal innovations in 2008-2009” is a dummy equal to one if the firm answers No to question 1), a) to question 2) and Yes to question 3), zero otherwise.

Data on fixed and total assets are from firms’ balance sheet information (BvD-Amadeus).

Further, in the following survey question, firms are requested to specify the type of information they normally provide to their main bank in the screening and monitoring process. The question reads out as follows: “Which type of information does the bank normally use/ask to assess your firm’s creditworthiness? (a) collateral (0/1); (b) balance sheet information (0/1); (c) interviews with management on firm’s policy and prospects (0/1); (d) business plan and firms’ targets (0/1); (e) historical records of payments and debt service (0/1); (f) brand recognition (0/1); (g) other (0/1).” Starting from this categorization, following Berger and Udell (2006), we build a dummy variable “Emphasis on Collateral” that equals one if the firm answers yes to a), and zero otherwise.

Relationship length is defined as the number of years the firm has been doing business with its main bank. The variable “Bank Involvement in Investments Finance” is based on a survey question asking the firms the percentage of investments that was financed with bank credit. We construct a dummy that equals 1 if this percentage is higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise.

Labor productivity of a firm is measured as value added per worker.

Leverage is defined as the total liabilities of the firm divided by total assets. As noted in the text, we also construct the ratios of bank debt over total liabilities and of short-term bank debt over total liabilities.

Cash flow of the firm is available from the Amadeus database. Liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of the value of cash and cash-equivalent instruments of the firm over total assets of the firm.

The sectoral measure of asset tangibility is obtained from Braun (2005).

The alternative dependent variable of columns 3-6 of Table A.2 is a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm undertook non-marginal innovation activities, did not postpone innovation, and, on top of this, applied for a patent in 2008-2009 or purchased foreign R&D and engineering services.

ROA is the return on assets, defined as the EBIT (earning before interests and taxes) over total assets. The Z-score is adapted from Altman (1977) to account for the case of non-listed firms. It is obtained as a linear combination of business ratios, weighted by coefficients. In particular, it includes current assets minus current liabilities, over total assets; retained earnings over total assets; earnings before interests and taxes, over total assets; book value of equity over total liabilities; and sales over total assets.

The proxy for exit is constructed from the Orbis and Amadeus databases, using information on the last year in which firms report information and status of the firms in the last year of report. The solvency ratio used in Supplementary Table S.4 is from Orbis and Amadeus.
Table A.1: Robustness Tests. Role of Firm Leverage, Debt and Cash

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probit</th>
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<tr>
<td>Controlling for Leverage</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Engage in Innovations 2008-2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Ass. &gt; median (dummy)</td>
<td>0.291***</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>II quartile of tot ass. (dummy)</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>III quartile of tot ass. (dummy)</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV quartile of tot ass. (dummy)</td>
<td>0.356***</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth fixed assets * (Total assets &gt; median)</td>
<td>-0.082***</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>-0.152*</td>
<td>-0.155**</td>
<td>-0.080***</td>
<td>-0.077***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth II q. tot ass.</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth III q. tot ass.</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>-0.160***</td>
<td>-0.160***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth IV q. tot ass.</td>
<td>-0.129**</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
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<td>Leverage</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank debt on total liabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short-term bank debt on total liabilities</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
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<td>Cash flow</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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Note: This table reports robustness tests for the baseline results of Table 1. In columns 1-5 of the table, we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-8 and 12 of Table 1 adding firm leverage as a control. In columns 6-7 of the table, we reestimate the baseline regressions of column 5 adding short-term bank debt over total liabilities as a control. In columns 8-17 we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-8 and 12 adding as a control the firm’s cash flow (column 8-12) and the firm’s liquidity ratio (columns 13-17). See Appendix A for more details on the variables. All the columns report the coefficients and all the regressions include industry and country fixed effects. For the list of other controls, not indicated in this table to conserve space, refer to Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
# Table A.2: Robustness Tests. Alternative Proxies; Role of Firm Profitability and Distress

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<tr>
<th>Panel (A): Alternative independent variable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Probit</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
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<td>Alternative measure of collateral availability: Asset tangibility</td>
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<table>
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<th>Panel (B): Alternative dependent variable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Probit</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
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<td>Alternative definition of innovation</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (C): Role of Profitability, Firm Distress, and “Gamble for Resurrection”</th>
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<tr>
<td>Probit</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Probit</td>
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<tr>
<td>(11)</td>
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<td>Start or Accelerate Non-marginal Innovations in 2008-2009</td>
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<table>
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<th>Panel (D): Propensity score matching</th>
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<td>Probit</td>
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<td>(15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Probit</td>
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<tr>
<td>(19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Start or Accelerate Non-marginal Innovations in 2008-2009</td>
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</table>

### Data Table

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Growth fixed assets</strong></td>
<td>0.120***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset tang. = median (dummy)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I quartile of ass. tang. (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II quartile of ass. tang. (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III quartile of ass. tang. (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.279***</td>
<td>-0.279***</td>
<td>-0.279***</td>
<td>-0.279***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV quartile of ass. tang. (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth fixed assets * (asset tang. = median)</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth fixed assets * (Total ass. &gt; median)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth f q. ass. tang.</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth * f q. ass. tang.</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth * f q. ass. tang.</td>
<td>0.247***</td>
<td>0.247***</td>
<td>0.247***</td>
<td>0.247***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth * f q. ass. tang.</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
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<td>ROA</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of skilled blue collars</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

- This table reports robustness tests for the baseline results of Table 1. In Panel A, columns 2-3 of the table, we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-6 of Table 1 by replacing total assets with the measure of collateral asset tangibility obtained from Baird (2009). In Panel B, columns 3-6 of the table, we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-8 of Table 1 using an alternative dependent variable constructed using additional information on patents and purchase of foreign R&D (see the text for details). In Panel C, columns 7-11 of the table, we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-8 of Table 1 by also controlling for the number of skilled blue collar workers of the firm. In Panel C, columns 12-16 of the table, we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-8 of Table 1 by also using a propensity score matching method. See Appendix A for more details on the variables. All the columns report the coefficients and all the regressions include industry and country fixed effects. For the list of other controls, not indicated in this table to conserve space, refer to Table 1. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix B

This Appendix B contains the main proofs for the theoretical model.

**Proof of Lemma 1**

If an entrepreneur adopts the innovative plan, and the lender exerts action, the entrepreneur chooses maintenance effort to maximize:

\[ \max_{\mu^I} (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\sigma^A \mu^I A pa - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I A)^2}{2} pa. \]

From the first order condition, we solve for \( \mu^I = \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\sigma^A}{\zeta} \).

If an entrepreneur adopts the innovative plan, while the lender chooses inaction, the entrepreneur chooses maintenance effort to maximize:

\[ \max_{\mu^I} (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\sigma^A \mu^I A pa - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I A)^2}{2} pa. \]

Therefore, \( \mu^I = \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\sigma^A}{\zeta} \).

If an entrepreneur does not adopt an innovative plan, the entrepreneur solves the problem:

\[ \max_{\mu^I} (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\mu^I pa - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I)^2}{2} pa. \]

Therefore, \( \mu^I = \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)}{\zeta} \).

**Proof of Lemma 2**

The incentive compatibility constraint for the lender is

\[ (1 - \sigma^A)\pi r^I_n + \sigma^A [\pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A pa] \geq (1 - \sigma^A)\pi r^I_n + \sigma^A [\pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A pa], \]  \( (13) \)

which implies equation (1). The participation constraint for the lender is

\[ (1 - \sigma^A)\pi r^I_n + \sigma^A [\pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A pa] \geq i. \]  \( (14) \)

Due to limited commitment, the lender can at most pledge \( l \) fraction of output. Therefore,

\[ r^I_n \leq ly(1 + n), \quad \text{and} \quad r^I_m \leq ly. \]

As shown in Figure A.1, for the existence of a feasible contract, the point \((r^I_m, r^I_n) = (ly, ly(1 + n))\) must lie in the shaded area. Therefore, \((ly, ly(1 + n))\) must satisfy two conditions: (i) it must lie above the PC, i.e.,

\[ (1 - \sigma^A)\pi ly(1 + n) + \sigma^A [\pi ly + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A pa] \geq i, \]
from which we can solve for
\[a \geq \frac{\zeta[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A_n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p} \equiv a^{IA}(p);\]

(ii) it is above the intersection of IC and PC, i.e.,
\[i + \frac{\sigma^A\sigma^\tilde{A}(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)pa}{\pi\zeta} \leq ly(1 + n),\]

from which we can solve for
\[a \leq \frac{\zeta[\pi ly(1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A\sigma^\tilde{A}(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p} \equiv \bar{a}(p).\]

Figure A.1: IC and PC of the lender

**Proof of Lemma 3**

If an entrepreneur adopts an innovative plan but the lender hinders innovation, the lender’s participation constraint is
\[(1 - \sigma^A)\pi r_n^I + \sigma^A \left[\pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I\bar{A} p a\right] \geq i.\tag{15}\]

Using the fact that \(r_n^I \leq ly(1 + n)\), and \(r_m^I \leq ly\), we can derive \(a^{IA}(p)\) in Lemma 3.

If an entrepreneur does not adopt an innovative plan, the lender’s participation constraint is
\[\pi r_m^\tilde{I} + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^\tilde{I} p a \geq i.\tag{16}\]

Using the fact that \(r_m^I \leq ly\), we can derive \(a^I(p)\) in Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 4

To show that $a^{IA}(p) < \bar{a}(p)$,

$$\frac{\bar{a}(p)}{a^{IA}(p)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\sigma^A[\pi ly(1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A)n]} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + n - \frac{\sigma^A\sigma^A_n}{\sigma^A + \sigma^A}.$$  

The last inequality holds under assumption A1, as $\frac{1}{1 + \sigma^A} < 1 - \frac{\sigma^A\sigma^A}{\sigma^A + \sigma^A}$, when $\sigma^A, \sigma^A_n \in (0, 1)$.

To show that $\bar{a}(p) > a^{IA}(p) < a(p)$,

$$\frac{a^{IA}(p)}{a^{IA}(p)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{(\sigma^A)^2[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A)n]}{(\sigma^A)^2[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A)n]} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + n - \frac{\sigma^A\sigma^A_n}{\sigma^A + \sigma^A},$$  

and

$$\frac{\bar{a}(p)}{a^{IA}(p)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\sigma^A[\pi ly(1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A)n]} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + n - \frac{\sigma^A\sigma^A_n}{\sigma^A + \sigma^A}.$$  

Both inequalities hold under assumption A1, as $\frac{1}{1 + \sigma^A} < 1 - \frac{\sigma^A\sigma^A_n}{\sigma^A + \sigma^A}$, when $\sigma^A, \sigma^A_n \in (0, 1)$.

To prove that $a^I(p) > a^{IA}(p)$ and $a^{IA}(p) < \bar{a}(p)$,

$$\frac{a^I(p)}{a^{IA}(p)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{(\sigma^A)^2(i - \pi ly)}{(i - \pi ly)(1 + n - \sigma^A)n} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + \frac{n}{1 + \sigma^A},$$  

and

$$\frac{\bar{a}(p)}{a^I(p)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\pi ly(1 + n) - i}{\sigma^A\sigma^A (i - \pi ly)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + \frac{n}{1 + \sigma^A\sigma^A}.$$  

The last inequality holds under assumption A1, as $\frac{1}{1 + \sigma^A} < \frac{1}{1 + \sigma^A\sigma^A}$, when $\sigma^A \in (0, 1)$.

To prove the last part of the lemma,

$$a^{IA}(p) > 0 \Leftrightarrow \zeta[i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A)n]] > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} > 1 + n - \sigma^A n,$$

Proof of Lemma 5

Firms with $a \in [a^{IA}(p), a^I(p)]$ have no option but to innovate in order to obtain credit. For a firm with $a \in [a^I(p), a^{IA}(p)]$, if it chooses an innovative plan, the lender will facilitate innovation. Such a firm chooses an innovative plan if and only if

$$(1 - \sigma^A)\pi [(1 + n)y - r^I_m] + \sigma^A [\pi (y - r^I_m) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\mu^I pa] - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I)^2}{2} pa$$

$$(1 - \sigma^A)\pi [(1 + n)y - r^I_m] + \sigma^A [\pi (y - r^I_m) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\mu^I pa] - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I)^2}{2} pa.$$

Using the lenders’ participation constraints (14) and (16), and the entrepreneurs’ choice of maintenance efforts in Lemma 1, we can get $a \leq \frac{2\pi ny}{(1 - \lambda)^2(1 - \lambda^2)(1 + \sigma^A)n} \equiv a^{*A}(p)$. Under the assumption $l < \frac{2\lambda}{1 + \lambda}$ and assumptions A1, we have $a^{*A}(p) > a^I(p)$. To see this,

$$\frac{a^{*A}(p)}{a^I(p)} > 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{i}{\pi ly} < 1 + \frac{2\lambda}{l(1 + \lambda)(1 + \sigma^A)}.$$
The latter holds when \( l < \frac{2\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \) and assumptions A1 holds.

For a firm with \( \alpha > \tilde{a}(p) \), if it chooses an innovative plan, the lender will not facilitate innovation, and innovation opportunities arrive with lower probability. Such a firm chooses an innovative plan if and only if

\[
(1 - \sigma^A)n \left[ (1 + n)y - r^f_n \right] + \sigma^A \left[ \pi \left( y - r^f_m \right) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)\mu I^A pa \right] - \frac{\zeta (\mu I^A)^2}{2} \leq a.
\]

Using the lenders’ participation constraints (15) and (16), and the entrepreneurs’ choice of maintenance efforts in Lemma 1, we can get \( a \leq \frac{2\xi_{ny}}{(1 - \pi)^2(1 - \lambda^2)(1 + \sigma^A)^2} \equiv a^*A(p) \). As \( \sigma^A > \sigma^A \), \( a^*A(p) < a^*A(p) \). Depending on the ranking of \( a^*A(p) \), \( a^*A(p) \), and \( \tilde{a}(p) \), we have the following three cases:

(i) If \( \frac{i}{\pi \theta} \leq 1 + n \frac{2\lambda \sigma^A \sigma^A}{\xi_{ny}(1 + \sigma^A)} \), then \( a^*A(p) < a^*A(p) \leq \tilde{a}(p) \). An entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \in \left[ a^*A(p), a^*A(p) \right] \).

(ii) If \( 1 + n \frac{2\lambda \sigma^A \sigma^A}{\xi_{ny}(1 + \sigma^A)} < \frac{i}{\pi \theta} < 1 + n \frac{2\lambda \sigma^A \sigma^A}{\xi_{ny}(1 + \sigma^A)} \), then \( a^*A(p) \leq \tilde{a}(p) < a^*A(p) \). An entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \in \left[ a^*A(p), \tilde{a}(p) \right] \).

(iii) If \( \frac{i}{\pi \theta} \geq 1 + n \frac{2\lambda \sigma^A \sigma^A}{\xi_{ny}(1 + \sigma^A)} \), then \( \tilde{a}(p) \leq a^*A(p) > a^*A(p) \). An entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if \( a \in \left[ a^*A(p), a^*A(p) \right] \).

**Proof and Lemma 6**

Equating demand and supply gives

\[
[1 - a^*A(p)] \pi \left( 1 - \frac{p}{\eta \theta} \right) = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \pi) \left[ 1 - a^*A(p)^2 \right]
\]

which can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{\pi}{\eta \theta} \frac{p^2}{2} - \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} p + \frac{\zeta [i - \pi \theta \left( 1 + n - \sigma^A n \right)]}{2 (\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda)} = 0.
\]

We obtain

\[
p^* = \frac{\eta \theta}{2\pi} \left\{ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} \pm \left[ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} \right]^2 - \frac{2\pi \zeta [i - \pi \theta \left( 1 + n - \sigma^A n \right)]}{\eta \theta (\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \right\}^{\frac{1}{2}}.
\]

We restrict the parameters to ensure that \( a^*A(p) < 1 \) and that there is a unique positive equilibrium price. This implies that \( a^*A(p_-) > 1 \) and \( a^*A(p_+) < 1 \). Substituting for the price, both hold when assumption A3 holds.

**Proof of Proposition 1**

The proof directly follows from Lemmas 1-6. There are two cases to be considered. First, \( \tilde{a}(p^*) \geq 1 \), which occurs whenever \( p^* \leq \frac{\zeta [n t y (1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \), i.e.,

\[
\tilde{a}(p^*) \geq 1 \leq \frac{\zeta [n t y (1 + n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \left[ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2\pi} - \frac{(1 - \pi)\sigma^A i - \pi \theta \left( 1 + n - \sigma^A n \right)}{2\pi \sigma^A \theta} \right]^{-1}.
\]

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In this case, all firms with collateral \( a > \underline{a}IA(p^*) \) have access to credit and potentially innovate.

Second, \( \bar{a}(p^*) < 1 \), which occurs whenever \( p^* > \frac{\zeta[p(1+n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1-\pi^A)^2 \lambda (1-\lambda)} \), i.e.,

\[
\eta \bar{\theta} > \frac{\zeta[p(1+n) - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1-\pi^A)^2 \lambda (1-\lambda)} \left[ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2\pi} - \frac{(1-\pi)\sigma^A i - \pi ly (1+n - \sigma^A n)}{2\pi \sigma^A \pi ly (1+n) - i} \right]^{-1}.
\]

In this case, all firms with collateral \( a \in [\underline{a}IA(p^*), \bar{a}(p^*)] \) have access to credit and potentially innovate, and all firms with collateral \( a > \bar{a}(p^*) \) have access to credit but do not innovate.

**Proof of Proposition 2**

Given (4), it is straightforward that \( \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} > 0 \). The investment change is computed by multiplying \( i \) by the change in the measure of firms obtaining credit, \( C = 1 - \underline{a}IA(p^*) \):

\[
\frac{\partial I}{\partial \eta} = i \frac{\partial C}{\partial \eta} = -i \frac{\partial \underline{a}IA(p^*)}{\partial p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} > 0.
\]

If (5) holds, the measure of firms that innovate equals that of firms with access to credit: \( C = N \).

Hence, \( \frac{\partial N}{\partial \eta} > 0 \). If (5) does not hold, \( N = \pi(p^*) - \underline{a}IA(p^*) \) and

\[
\frac{\partial N}{\partial \eta} = - \frac{\underline{a}(p^*) - \underline{a}IA(p^*)}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta}.
\]

Assumption A2 implies that \( \frac{\partial N}{\partial \eta} < 0 \).

Consider now output. If (5) holds, letting \( L \) denote the measure of investors,

\[
Y = \omega L + C \left[ \pi y (1 + n - n \sigma^A) - i \right] + \pi C \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\theta}} d\theta.
\]

The second term is increasing in \( \eta \) because \( \frac{\partial C}{\partial \eta} > 0 \). We show the third term is also increasing in \( \eta \),

\[
\pi C \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\theta}} d\theta = \pi C \frac{\eta^2 \bar{\theta}^2 - \bar{\theta}^2}{2 \eta \bar{\theta}} = \frac{\eta \theta}{2 \pi C} \left( 1 - \frac{p^*}{\eta} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{p^*}{\eta} \right) = \frac{\eta \theta}{2} D(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^*}{\eta} \right) = \frac{\eta \theta}{2} S(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^*}{\eta} \right).
\]

It is straightforward to show that \( \frac{\partial S(p^*)}{\partial \eta} > 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} > 0 \). Therefore, the third term is also increasing in \( \eta \) if (5) does not hold,

\[
Y = \omega L + C \left\{ \pi \left[ 1 + \frac{N}{C} (1 - \sigma^A)n \right] y - i \right\} + \pi C \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\theta}} d\theta.
\]

An increase in \( \eta \) raises output iff

\[
\frac{\partial C}{\partial \eta} (\pi y - i) + \frac{\partial}{\partial \eta} \left( C \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\theta}} d\theta \right) > -\frac{\partial N}{\partial \eta} \pi (1 - \sigma^A) ny.
\]

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The Following Supplement is Not Intended for Publication.
Supplement. Not for Publication

This supplement contains:
Section A) technical proofs omitted from the main text;
Section B) robustness analysis: a case in which the new technology has higher success probability than the mature technology (Section B.1); a case in which the new technology has lower success probability than the mature technology (Section B.2); a case in which the assets of the new technology have positive liquidation value (Section B.3);
Section C) further extensions of the baseline setting: a case in which the lender has control over the probability of project success (Section C.1); a case of a shock given by a drop in the probability of project success $\pi$ (Section C.2);
Section D) numerical experiments;
Section E) supplementary empirical figures and tables: supplementary Tables S.3 and S.4 for the empirical analysis, as well as Figure S.5 for the joint distribution of firms’ collateral and innovation.

A  Technical Proofs

Proof of Lemma 7

The marginal firm that obtains credit has collateral equal to $a_{IA}(p^*)$. The social value of this marginal firm is

$$V = (1 - \sigma^A) \left[ \pi y(1 + n) + (1 - \pi) \eta \hat{\theta} a_{IA}(p^*) \right] + \sigma^A \left[ \pi y + (1 - \pi) \eta \hat{\theta} a_{IA}(p^*) \right] - i,$$

where $\hat{\theta}$ is the marginal buyer of resale assets. The maintenance costs are assumed to be transfers, so they are not subtracted from the social value. We now show that the social value of the marginal firm is positive. The participation constraint of the marginal firm’s lender implies that

$$(1 - \sigma^A) \pi ly(1 + n) + \sigma^A \left[ \pi ly + \lambda(1 - \pi) \mu^A p^* a_{IA}(p^*) \right] = (1 - \sigma^A) \pi ly(1 + n) + \sigma^A \left[ \pi ly + \lambda(1 - \pi) \mu^A \eta \hat{\theta} a_{IA}(p^*) \right] = i.$$

Therefore,

$$V = (1 - \sigma^A) \left[ \pi(1 - l)y(1 + n) + (1 - \pi) \eta \hat{\theta} a_{IA}(p^*) \right] + \sigma^A \left[ \pi(1 - l)y + (1 - \pi) \eta \hat{\theta} a_{IA}(p^*) (1 - \lambda \mu^A) \right] > 0.$$ 

The last inequality holds both because $l < 1$ (i.e., the social planner would account for the output not pledgeable to investors) and because the social planner would internalize the asset liquidation returns of the new technology (which are a transfer). It follows that in the allocation chosen by the social planner, a positive measure of firms with $a < a_{IA}(p^*)$ would invest.

In the social planner’s problem, all funded firms will take the innovative plan. This is because (i) since the liquidation costs are a transfer, in the event of project failure the asset liquidation returns of the two technologies are equal; (ii) in the event of project success the output of the new technology exceeds that of the mature since $y(1 + n) > y$. 

Supp.Page 1
Proof of Proposition 3

The asset demand and supply are

\[ D(p) = [1 - a^{IA}(p)] \pi \left( 1 - \frac{p - \tau}{\eta \theta} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad S(p) = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \pi) \left[ 1 - a^{IA}(p)^2 \right]. \]

Equating \( D(p) \) and \( S(p) \) and solving for \( p \),

\[ p^*(\tau) = \frac{\tau}{2} + \frac{\eta \theta}{2\pi} \left\{ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} \pm \left[ \left( \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} + \frac{\pi \tau}{\eta \theta} \right)^2 - \frac{2\pi \left( i - \pi n \right) (1 + n - \sigma^A n)}{\eta \theta (\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \right]^{1/2} \right\}. \]

To ensure that there exists a unique positive equilibrium price, we need \( a^{IA}(p_+) < 1 \) and \( a^{IA}(p_-) > 1 \). These hold whenever

\[ \eta \theta \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) > \frac{\pi}{2} \left[ \frac{\zeta \left( i - \pi n \right) (1 + n - \sigma^A n)}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda)} - \tau \right] \]

and the unique price is

\[ p^*(\tau) = \frac{\tau}{2} + \frac{\eta \theta}{2\pi} \left\{ \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} + \left[ \left( \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} + \frac{\pi \tau}{\eta \theta} \right)^2 - \frac{2\pi \left( i - \pi n \right) (1 + n - \sigma^A n)}{\eta \theta (\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \right]^{1/2} \right\}. \]

Clearly, \( \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \tau} > 0 \). Thus,

\[ \frac{\partial C(\pi)}{\partial \tau} = - \frac{\partial a^{IA}(p^*)}{\partial p^*} \frac{\partial p^*(\tau)}{\partial \tau} > 0. \]

If (7) holds, the measure of innovative firms equals that of firms with access to credit. Hence, \( \frac{\partial N(\tau)}{\partial \tau} > 0 \). To show that \( \partial Y/\partial \tau > 0 \), note that if (7) holds,

\[ Y = \omega L + C \left[ \pi y \left( 1 + n - n \sigma^A \right) - i \right] + \pi C \int_{\frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta}}^{\frac{\eta \theta}{\eta \theta}} \theta d\theta. \]

The second term increases in \( \tau \) because \( \frac{\partial C}{\partial \tau} > 0 \). It remains to show that the third term also increases in \( \tau \). If \( \partial (p^* - \tau)/\partial \tau \leq 0 \), then it immediately follows that \( \pi C \int_{\frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta}}^{\frac{\eta \theta}{\eta \theta}} \theta d\theta \) increases in \( \tau \). If \( \partial (p^* - \tau)/\partial \tau > 0 \), note that

\[ \pi C \int_{\frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta}}^{\frac{\eta \theta}{\eta \theta}} \frac{\eta \theta}{2} d\theta = \frac{\eta \theta}{2} \pi C \left( 1 - \frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta} \right) \]

\[ = \frac{\eta \theta}{2} D(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta} \right) = \frac{\eta \theta}{2} S(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta} \right). \]

Because \( \frac{\partial S(p^*)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\partial S(p^*)}{\partial p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \tau} > 0 \), \( \frac{\eta \theta}{2} S(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta} \right) \) increases in \( \tau \), and so does \( \pi C \int_{\frac{p^* - \tau}{\eta \theta}}^{\frac{\eta \theta}{\eta \theta}} \theta d\theta \).

Therefore, whether \( \partial (p^* - \tau)/\partial \tau \leq 0 \) or not, we have shown that the third term is also increasing in \( \tau \).

If (7) does not hold, \( N = \bar{a}^{IA}(p^*) - a(p^*) \) and

\[ \frac{\partial N(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = - \frac{\bar{a}(p^*) - a^{IA}(p^*)}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*(\tau)}{\partial \tau} < 0. \]

\[ \text{Supp.Page 2} \]
Output equals
\[ Y = \omega L + C \left\{ \pi \left[ 1 + \frac{N}{C} (1 - \sigma^A) n \right] y - i \right\} + \pi C \int_{\nu}^{\bar{\nu}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\nu}} d\theta. \]

An increase in \( \tau \) raises output iff
\[ \frac{\partial C}{\partial \tau} (\pi y - i) + \pi \left( C \int_{\nu}^{\bar{\nu}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\tau} d\theta \right) > -\frac{\partial N}{\partial \tau} (1 - \sigma^A) ny. \]

**Proof of Proposition 4**

The asset demand and supply are
\[ D(p) = (1 - a_G) \pi \left( 1 - \frac{p}{\eta \theta} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad S(p) = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \pi) (1 - a^2_G). \]

Equating
\[ p^*(a_G) = \frac{\eta \bar{\theta}}{2\pi} \left[ 3\pi - 1 - (1 - \pi) a_G \right]. \]

We let \( a_{IA}^*(p^*) < 1 \), which holds whenever
\[ \eta \bar{\theta} \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) > \frac{\zeta \left[ i - \pi l y \left( 1 + n - \sigma^A n \right) \right]}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)} \frac{(2\pi - 1) \pi}{3\pi - 1 - (1 - \pi) a_G}. \]

Clearly, \( \frac{\partial p^*(a_G)}{\partial a_G} < 0 \), and
\[ \frac{\partial C(a_G)}{\partial a_G} = \frac{\partial (1 - a_G)}{\partial a_G} = -1 < 0. \]

If (9) holds, the measure of innovative firms equals that of firms with access to credit. Hence, \( \frac{\partial N}{\partial a_G} < 0 \). To show that \( \partial Y / \partial a_G < 0 \), note that
\[ Y = \omega L + C \left[ \pi y \left( 1 + n - n \sigma^A \right) - i \right] + \pi C \int_{\nu}^{\bar{\nu}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\nu}} d\theta. \]

The second term decreases in \( a_G \) because \( \frac{\partial C}{\partial a_G} < 0 \). To show that the third term decreases in \( a_G \), note that
\[ \pi C \int_{\nu}^{\bar{\nu}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\bar{\nu}} d\theta = \pi C \frac{\eta^2 \bar{\nu}^2 - p^* \bar{\nu}^2}{2\eta \theta} = \frac{\eta \bar{\theta}}{2} \pi C \left( 1 - \frac{p^*}{\eta \theta} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{p^*}{\eta \theta} \right) = \frac{\eta \bar{\theta}}{2} D(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^*}{\eta \theta} \right) = \frac{\eta \bar{\theta}}{2} S(p^*) \left( 1 + \frac{p^*}{\eta \theta} \right). \]

Because \( \frac{\partial S(p^*)}{\partial a_G} = \frac{\partial S(p^*)}{\partial p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial a_G} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial a_G} < 0 \), the third term decreases in \( a_G \).

If (9) does not hold, \( \bar{N} = \bar{a}(p^*) - a_G \) and
\[ \frac{\partial N(a_G)}{\partial a_G} = \frac{\partial [\pi(p^*(a_G)) - a_G]}{\partial a_G} = -\frac{\zeta \pi l y (1 + n) - i}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)p^*(a_G)^2} \frac{\partial p^*(a_G)}{\partial a_G} - 1. \]

This is positive iff
\[ -\frac{\zeta \pi l y (1 + n) - i}{\sigma^A \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda)p^*(a_G)^2} \frac{\partial p^*(a_G)}{\partial a_G} > 1. \]
Plugging in $\frac{\partial p^\ast(a_G)}{\partial a_G}$,
\[
\eta \bar{y} < \frac{\zeta \left[ \pi ly(1 + n) - i \right]}{\sigma^A\sigma^A(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)} \frac{2\pi(1 - \pi)}{3\pi - 1 - (1 - \pi) a_G}.
\]

Output equals
\[
Y = \omega L + C \left\{ \pi \left[ 1 + \frac{N}{C}(1 - \sigma^A)n \right] y - i \right\} + \pi C \int_{\frac{\pi}{\eta}}^{\frac{\pi}{\eta}} \frac{\eta \theta}{\eta} d\theta.
\]

An increase in $a_G$ reduces output iff
\[
\frac{\partial C}{\partial a_G} (\pi y - i) + \pi \left( C \int \frac{\eta \theta}{\eta} d\theta \right) < -\frac{\partial N}{\partial a_G} (1 - \sigma^A) ny,
\]
which always holds if $\partial N/\partial a_G < 0$, as the left-hand-side is negative.

**Proof of Lemma 8**

An entrepreneur cannot innovate under relationship funding and can innovate under transactional funding iff $a \in (\pi^R(p), \pi^T(p))$. In this case, the condition under which an entrepreneur chooses transactional funding is
\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi \left[ (1 + n) y - r_n^{IT} \right] + \sigma^A \left[ \pi \left( y - r_n^{IT} \right) + (1 - \pi) \left( 1 - \lambda \right) \mu^{IAT} pa \right] - \frac{\zeta^T (\mu^{IAT})^2}{2} pa
\]
\[
\geq \pi \left( y - r_m^{IT} \right) + (1 - \pi) \left( 1 - \lambda \right) \mu^R pa - \frac{\zeta^R (\mu^R)^2}{2} pa.
\]

The repayments $r_n^{IT}$ and $r_n^{IT}$ that guarantee zero profits to a transactional lender when the innovation can occur satisfy
\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi r_n^{IT} + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r_n^{IT} + \lambda(1 - \pi) \mu^{IAT} pa \right] = i,
\]
whereas the repayment $r_m^{IR}$ that guarantees zero profits to a relationship lender when the innovation cannot occur satisfies
\[
\pi r_m^{IR} + \lambda(1 - \pi) \mu^R pa = i.
\]

Using the above two equations to substitute into (19), we obtain
\[
a \leq \frac{2 \zeta^R \zeta^T (1 - \sigma^A) \pi ny}{(1 - \pi)^2(1 - \lambda^2) \left[ \zeta^T - \zeta^R (\sigma^A)^2 \right] p} \equiv \hat{a}(p).
\]

**Proof of Lemma 9**

A mixed finance regime occurs when $\hat{a}(p) > \pi^R(p)$, which can be rewritten as
\[
\frac{i}{\pi ly} > 1 + n - \frac{2 \zeta^T (1 - \sigma^A) \sigma^A \lambda n}{(1 + \lambda) \left[ \zeta^T - \zeta^R (\sigma^A)^2 \right] l}.
\]
Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 restrict that $1+n−σ^A n < \frac{i}{πy} < \min \left\{ 1 + \frac{n}{1+σ^A}, 1 + \left[ \frac{1}{1+σ^A} − \frac{(σ^A ζ^T−ζ^R)(σ^A)^2}{(σ^A ζ^T+σ^Aζ^R)(1+σ^A)} \right] n \right\}$.

(i) If $1+n−2ζ^T(1−σ^A)σ^A λ n \frac{(1+λ)}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]} ≤ 1+n−σ^A n$, that is, $l ≤ \frac{2ζ^T(1−σ^A)σ^A λ}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]}$, then entrepreneurs with $a ∈ (\bar{a}(p^*), \bar{a}(p^*))$ choose transactional funding and set a contract that induces the lender to choose the action that facilitates innovation.

(ii) If $1+n−\frac{2ζ^T(1−σ^A)σ^A λ n}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]} ≥ \min \left\{ 1 + \frac{n}{1+σ^A}, 1 + \left[ \frac{1}{1+σ^A} − \frac{(σ^A ζ^T−ζ^R)(σ^A)^2}{(σ^A ζ^T+σ^Aζ^R)(1+σ^A)} \right] n \right\}$, that is, $l ≥ \min \left\{ \frac{2λ(1−σ^A)^2}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]^2}, \frac{2ζ^T(1−σ^A)σ^A λ}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]} \right\} = \bar{l}$, mixed finance regime never occurs.

(iii) If $1+n−σ^A n < 1+n−\frac{2ζ^T(1−σ^A)σ^A λ n}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]} < \min \left\{ 1 + \frac{n}{1+σ^A}, 1 + \left[ \frac{1}{1+σ^A} − \frac{(σ^A ζ^T−ζ^R)(σ^A)^2}{(σ^A ζ^T+σ^Aζ^R)(1+σ^A)} \right] n \right\}$, that is, $l ∈ (\bar{l}, \bar{l})$, there are two regimes of parameters consistent with assumptions 1, 2, and 4.

When $\frac{i}{πy} ≤ 1+n−\frac{2ζ^T(1−σ^A)σ^A λ n}{(1+λ)[ζ^T−ζ^R(σ^A)^2]}$, the relationship regime occurs, and the mixed regime occurs otherwise.

**Proof of Proposition 6**

The proof for the effects in the relationship regime and for the effects on the asset price, investment, and the measure of firms with access to credit in the mixed regime are as in case (ii) of Proposition 2.

Here we first present the proof for the effects of the shock on the measure of innovative firms and on output in the mixed finance regime, which are similar to those in case (ii) of Proposition 2. In the mixed finance regime, the measure of firms that innovate is

$$N_m = \min \{ \bar{a}(p^*), \bar{a}(p^*) \} − a^{IAR}(p^*) .$$

Hence,

$$\frac{∂N_m}{∂η} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
-\bar{a}(p^*)−a^{IAR}(p^*) & \text{if } \bar{a}(p^*) ≥ \bar{a}(p) \\
-\bar{a}(p^*)−a^{IAR}(p^*) & \text{if } \bar{a}(p^*) < \bar{a}(p^*) \end{array} \right. .$$

The existence of the mixed financing regime implies that $\min \{ \bar{a}(p^*), \bar{a}(p^*) \} − a^{IAR} > 0$. Thus, it is always the case that $\frac{∂N_m}{∂η} < 0$.

Output is given by

$$Y_j = ω L + C \left\{ \pi \left[ 1 + \frac{N_j}{C} (1−σ^A) n \right] y − i \right\} + \pi C \int_{\bar{θ}}^{θ} \frac{η\bar{θ}}{θ} dθ,$$

where $j ∈ \{ r, m \}$ identifies the relationship or mixed credit regime. $\frac{∂Y_j}{∂η} > 0$ if

$$\frac{∂C}{∂η} (πy − i) + \pi \int_{\bar{θ}}^{θ} \frac{η\bar{θ}}{θ} dθ > −\frac{∂N_j}{∂η} π (1−σ^A) ny .$$

We then study credit relationships. In the relationship regime, their measure $(R_r)$ equals that of active firms $(C)$:

$$R_r = C = 1 − a^{IAR} .$$
Thus,
\[
\frac{\partial R}{\partial \eta} = \frac{\partial C}{\partial \eta} = \frac{a^{IAR}(p^*)}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} > 0.
\]

In the mixed regime,
\[
R_m = C - \left[ \min \{ \tilde{a}(p^*), \bar{a}^T(p^*) \} - \bar{a}^R(p^*) \right] = 1 - \frac{a^{IAR}(p^*)}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta}.
\]

Hence,
\[
\frac{\partial R_m}{\partial \eta} = \begin{cases} 
\frac{a^{IAR}(p^*)}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} & \text{if } a^T(p^*) \leq \tilde{a}(p^*) \\
\frac{a^{IAR}(p^*)}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} + \frac{\partial \hat{a}(p^*)}{\partial \eta} - \frac{\partial \bar{a}^R(p^*)}{\partial \eta} & \text{if } a^T(p^*) > \hat{a}(p^*)
\end{cases}
\]

Therefore, \( \frac{\partial R_m}{\partial \eta} > 0 \). Next, we study how the measure of relationships changes relative to that of active firms. One can show that
\[
\frac{\partial (R_m C)}{\partial \eta} = \frac{C - R_m C}{p^*} \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta}.
\]

**Proof of Lemma 10**

Introducing managers into the model does not change the optimal maintenance efforts of entrepreneurs \((\mu^{IA}, \mu^{I\bar{A}}, \mu^{I})\) in Lemma 1, because maintenance generates positive expected payoff only when the mature technology is used and the project fails.

A manager’s participation constraint is
\[
(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n(w + w_n) + \sigma^A \pi w \geq e,
\]

while the lowest \( w_n \) satisfying (10) is
\[
w_n = \frac{\pi - \pi_n}{\pi_n} w.
\]

Using (20) and (21),
\[
w_n = \frac{(\pi - \pi_n) e}{\pi_n \pi}
\]

and \( w = \frac{e}{\pi} \). Thus, the compensation in case of successful adoption of the new technology is \( w + w_n = \frac{e}{\pi} \). Next, consider the lender. The incentive compatibility constraint for the lender is
\[
(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r_n^I + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \right] \geq (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r_n^I + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \right].
\]

That is,
\[
\pi_n r_n^I - \pi r_m^I \geq \frac{(\sigma^A + \sigma^A)(1 - \pi)2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)\mu^I}{\zeta}.
\]

The participation constraint for the lender is
\[
(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r_n^I + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \right] \geq i.
\]

Due to limited commitment, the lender can at most pledge \( l \) fraction of output. We also need to take into account the payment to managers. Therefore,
\[
r_n^I \leq ly(1 + n) - (w + w_n) = ly(1 + n) - \frac{e}{\pi_n}.
\]
\[ r_m^I \leq l y - w = ly - \frac{e}{\pi}. \]

Following the same logic as the proof of Lemma 2, one can show that the two thresholds become

\[ a'_{IA}(p) = \frac{\zeta[i + e - (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n l(1 + n)y - \sigma^A \pi ly]}{(\sigma^A)^2(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p}, \]

\[ a'(p) = \frac{\zeta[\pi_n l y(1 + n) - e - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p}. \]

Consider now the scenario in which the manager cannot prevent the innovation. The manager’s participation constraint under innovation is

\[ (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n w + \sigma^A \pi w \geq e, \]

from which

\[ w = \frac{e}{(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n + \sigma^A \pi}. \]

Therefore, the pledgeable returns to the lender are

\[ r_n^I \leq l y(1 + n) - w = l y(1 + n) - \frac{e}{(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n + \sigma^A \pi}, \]

\[ r_m^I \leq l y - w = l y - \frac{e}{(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n + \sigma^A \pi}. \]

The lender’s IC and PC are the same as the case with moral hazard. Therefore, one can solve for

\[ a''(p) = \frac{\zeta[\pi_n l y(1 + n) - \frac{\sigma^A l y}{(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n + \sigma^A \pi} - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p}, \]

and

\[ a''_{IA}(p) = a'^{IA}(p). \]

One can show that

\[ \pi''(p) = \frac{\zeta[\pi_n l y(1 + n) + \frac{\sigma^A l y}{(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n + \sigma^A \pi} - e - i]}{\sigma^A \sigma^A(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p} > a'(p). \]

**Proof of Proposition 7**

The difference between the asset demand \( D'(p) \) in the presence of managerial moral hazard and the demand \( D''(p) \) in its absence is

\[ D'(p) - D''(p) = \left[ a''(p) - a'(p) \right] (1 - \sigma^A) (\pi - \pi_n) \left( 1 - \frac{p}{\eta^2} \right) > 0, \]

while the difference in the supply is

\[ S'(p) - S''(p) = -\left\{ \frac{[a''(p)]^2}{2} - \frac{[a'(p)]^2}{2} \right\} (1 - \sigma^A) (\pi - \pi_n) < 0. \]
Thus, the equilibrium price is higher in the presence of moral hazard: \( p' > p'' \). The difference in the measure of innovative firms is (assuming \( \pi' < 1 \), which holds if \( \eta \bar{\eta} \) is large enough)

\[
N'(p') - N''(p'') = \left[ \bar{\pi}'(p') - \bar{\sigma}'A(p') \right] - \left[ \bar{\pi}''(p'') - \bar{\sigma}''A(p'') \right] < \left[ \bar{\pi}'(p') - \bar{\sigma}'A(p') \right] - \left[ \bar{\pi}'(p') - \bar{\sigma}'A(p') \right] = 0.
\]

The first inequality holds because \( \bar{\pi}'(p'') < \bar{\pi}''(p'') \) and \( \bar{\sigma}'A(p'') = \bar{\sigma}''A(p'') \). The second inequality holds because \( p' > p'' \) and \( \left[ \bar{\pi}(p) - \bar{\sigma}'A(p) \right] \) is decreasing in \( p \).

### B Robustness Analysis

#### B.1 Robustness: new technology has a higher success probability

Our model assumes that the new technology is more productive than the mature technology (\( n > 0 \)). In this section, we study an alternative setting where the new technology has a higher success probability. We show that all agents’ decisions are the same as the main model when parameters are chosen in a specific way. Suppose the new technology has the same output \( y \) as the mature technology but a higher probability of success \( \pi_n > \pi \). We show that the lenders’ and entrepreneurs’ problems are equivalent to those in the main model, when \( \pi_n \) is chosen in a specific way.

**Entrepreneurs’ maintenance effort.** The maintenance efforts \( \mu^IA, \mu^LA, \) and \( \mu^I \) are the same as in Lemma 1, because mature assets are only useful when the mature technology is adopted and therefore the value of \( \pi_n \) is irrelevant.

**The lender’s decision whether to take an action to innovate.** The lender’s IC (13) becomes

\[
(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r^I_n + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A p_a \right] \geq (1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r^I_n + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A p_a \right],
\]

that is,

\[
\pi_n r^I_n - \pi r^I_m \geq \frac{(\sigma^A + \sigma^A)(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p_a}{\zeta}.
\]

The participation constraint for the lender (14) is

\[
(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r^I_n + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A p_a \right] \geq i.
\]

Due to limited commitment, the entrepreneur can at most pledge a fraction \( l \) of output. Therefore,

\[
r^I_n \leq ly, \quad \text{and} \quad r^I_m \leq ly.
\]

Now let \( r^I_n = \frac{\pi_n}{\pi} r^I_n \). Substituting for \( r^I_n \) in (24) and (25), we get

\[
\pi_n r^I_n - \pi r^I_m \geq \frac{(\sigma^A + \sigma^A)(1 - \pi)^2\lambda(1 - \lambda)p_a}{\zeta},
\]

and

\[
(1 - \sigma^A)\pi_n r^I_n + \sigma^A \left[ \pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I A p_a \right] \geq i,
\]

which are identical as (1) and (14) in Lemma 2. The limited commitment constraint yields that

\[
r^I_n \leq l\frac{\pi_n}{\pi} y, \quad \text{and} \quad r^I_m \leq ly.
\]
Therefore, if \( \pi_n = 1 + n \), the lender’s problem is exactly the same as that in Lemma 2. Similarly, the lender’s participation constraint when she hinders innovation is the same as that in (15), and her participation constraint when the entrepreneur does not take an innovative plan is the same as that in (16).

**The entrepreneur’s decision whether to adopt an innovative plan.** The entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if and only if

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi_n (y - r_n^I) + \sigma^A [\pi (y - r_m^I) + (1 - \pi) (1 - \lambda) \mu^I A pa] - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I A)^2}{2} \geq 0.
\]

Again, let \( \tilde{r}_n^I = \frac{n}{n^*} r_n^I \) and \( \pi_n = 1 + n \), this constraint becomes

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi_n (y - \tilde{r}_n^I) + \sigma^A [\pi (y - r_m^I) + (1 - \pi) (1 - \lambda) \mu^I A pa] - \frac{\zeta (\mu^I A)^2}{2} \geq 0.
\]

which is identical as (17). Similarly, conditional on that the lender hinders innovation, we can get an identical incentive constraint for the entrepreneur as in (18).

**B.2 Robustness: new technology has a lower success probability**

In this section, we study an alternative setting where the new technology has a lower success probability. We show that all agents’ decisions are the same as in the main model when parameters are chosen in a specific way. Suppose the new technology has output \( ny(1+n') \) but a lower probability of success \( \pi_n < \pi \). We show that the lenders’ and entrepreneurs’ problems are equivalent to those in the main model, when \( \pi_n \) and \( n' \) are chosen in a specific way.

**Entrepreneurs’ maintenance effort.** The maintenance efforts \( \mu^I A, \mu^I A, \) and \( \mu^I \) are the same as in Lemma 1, because mature assets are only useful when the mature technology is adopted and therefore the value of \( \pi_n \) is irrelevant.

**The lender’s decision whether to take an action to innovate.** The lender’s IC (13) becomes

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi_n r_n^I + \sigma^A [\pi r_m^I + \lambda (1 - \pi) \mu^I A pa] \geq (1 - \sigma^A) \pi_n r_n^I + \sigma^A [\pi r_m^I + \lambda (1 - \pi) \mu^I A pa],
\]

that is,

\[
\pi_n r_n^I - \pi r_m^I \geq \frac{(\sigma^A + \sigma^A) (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda) pa}{\zeta}.
\]

The participation constraint for the lender (14) becomes

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi_n r_n^I + \sigma^A [\pi r_m^I + \lambda (1 - \pi) \mu^I A pa] \geq i.
\]

Due to limited commitment, the entrepreneur can at most pledge a fraction \( l \) of output. Therefore,

\[
r_n^I \leq l(1 + n') y, \quad \text{and} \quad r_m^I \leq l y.
\]
Now let \( \tilde{r}_n^I = \frac{\pi}{\pi} r_n^I \). Substituting for \( r_n^I \) in (27) and (28), we get

\[
\pi \tilde{r}_n^I - \pi r_m^I \geq \frac{(\sigma^A + \sigma^A)(1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda) p a}{\zeta},
\]

and

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi \tilde{r}_n^I + \sigma^A [\pi r_m^I + \lambda (1 - \pi) \mu A p a] \geq i,
\]

which are identical as (1) and (14) in Lemma 2. The limited commitment constraint yields that

\[
\tilde{r}_n^I \leq l \pi (1 + n') y, \quad \text{and} \quad r_m^I \leq l y.
\]

Therefore, if \( \frac{\pi}{\pi} (1 + n') = 1 + n \), the lender’s problem is exactly the same as that in Lemma 2. Similarly, the lender’s participation constraint when she hinders innovation is the same as that in (15), and her participation constraint when the entrepreneur does not take an innovative plan is the same as that in (16).

**The entrepreneur’s decision whether to adopt an innovative plan.** The entrepreneur chooses an innovative plan if and only if

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi_n [y(1 + n') - r_n^I] + \sigma^A [\pi (y - r_m^I) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda) \mu A p a] - \frac{\zeta (\mu A)^2}{2} p a
\]

\[
\geq \pi (y - r_m^I) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda) \mu I p a - \frac{\zeta (\mu I)^2}{2} p a.
\]

Again, let \( \tilde{r}_n^I = \frac{\pi}{\pi} r_n^I \) and \( \frac{\pi}{\pi} (1 + n') = 1 + n \), this constraint becomes

\[
(1 - \sigma^A) \pi [(1 + n) y - \tilde{r}_n^I] + \sigma^A [\pi (y - r_m^I) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda) \mu A p a] - \frac{\zeta (\mu A)^2}{2} p a
\]

\[
\geq \pi (y - r_m^I) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda) \mu I p a - \frac{\zeta (\mu I)^2}{2} p a,
\]

which is identical as (17). Similarly, conditional on that the lender hinders innovation, we can get an identical incentive constraint for the entrepreneur as in (18).

**B.3 Robustness: positive liquidation value of new technology**

In this supplementary section we consider a scenario where the assets of the new technology have a positive liquidation value but lower than those of the mature technology. Precisely, since the entrepreneur chooses the maintenance effort before knowing whether the innovation opportunity will arise, the optimal maintenance effort solves

\[
\max_{\mu I} \left\{ [\sigma^A \mu I + (1 - \sigma^A) \rho \mu I] (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda) p a - \frac{\zeta (\mu I)^2}{2} p a \right\},
\]

where \( j \in \{A, \overline{A}\} \) corresponds to the choice of the lender whether to carry out the action that facilitates innovation. The difference from the benchmark is that now the assets of the new technology
have a liquidation value $\rho \mu I^j pa$, where $\rho \in (0, 1]$. Under this specification, if the entrepreneur chooses the innovative plan, the optimal maintenance effort is given by

$$\mu^I_j = \frac{[\sigma^j + (1 - \sigma^j)\rho] (1 - \pi)(1 - \lambda)}{\zeta}.$$ 

Note that, as in the benchmark environment, the entrepreneur exerts more effort if the lender does not carry out the action. Note also that the maintenance effort increases with $\rho$, irrespective of the choice of the lender; but the impact of an increase in $\rho$ on the maintenance effort is stronger if the lender does carry the action that facilitates innovation ($j = A$).

If the entrepreneur chooses the innovative plan, the lender chooses to undertake the action that facilitates innovation if and only if (where we break the tie in favour of innovation)

$$\{ (1 - \sigma^A) [\pi r^I_n + \lambda(1 - \pi)\rho \mu I^A pa] \} \geq \{ (1 - \sigma^A) [\pi r^I_n + \lambda(1 - \pi)\rho \mu I^A pa] \},$$

which can be rewritten as

$$r^I_n - r^I_m \geq \frac{(1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)pa}{\pi \zeta} \left\{ \left( \sigma^A + \sigma^A \right) + \rho \left[ (1 - \sigma^A) + (1 - \sigma^A) \right] \right\} (1 - \rho).$$

The above inequality corresponds to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) of the lender. As in the benchmark environment, its right-hand side captures the reduction in the expected liquidation proceeds of the lender if she chooses to facilitate innovation. Note that an increase in $\rho$ impacts the right-hand side in two ways. First, for any given maintenance effort, an increase in $\rho$ increases the liquidation value of the new technology, thus favouring innovation. However, this effect is partially dampened by the increase in the maintenance effort associated with an increase in $\rho$.

In turn, the participation constraint (PC) of the lender becomes

$$(1 - \sigma^A) [\pi r^I_n + \lambda(1 - \pi)\rho \mu I^A pa] + \sigma^A [\pi r^I_m + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu I^A pa] \geq i,$$

which can be rewritten as

$$(1 - \sigma^A)r^I_n + \sigma^A r^I_m + \frac{(1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)pa}{\pi \zeta} \left[ \sigma^A + \rho(1 - \sigma^A) \right] \geq i.$$

We can use the modified IC and PC to solve for the corresponding thresholds $d^I_p(p)$ and $\bar{a}(p)$. We obtain that the lender is willing to fund the project when the entrepreneur chooses the innovative plan if and only if

$$a \geq \frac{\zeta \left[ i - \pi ly (1 + n - \sigma^A p) \right]}{\left[ \sigma^A + \rho(1 - \sigma^A) \right]^2 (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)p} \equiv d^I_p(p),$$

which collapses to $d^I(p)$ if $\rho = 0$. In turn, the lender is willing to carry out the action that facilitates the innovation if and only if

$$a \leq \frac{\zeta \left[ \pi ly(1 + n) - i \right]}{\left\{ \sigma^A (1 - \rho) \left[ \sigma^A + \rho \left( 1 - \sigma^A \right) \right] - \rho \left[ \sigma^A + \rho(1 - \sigma^A) \right] \right\} (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda(1 - \lambda)p} \equiv \bar{a}(p),$$

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which collapses to \( p_\rho(p) \) if \( \rho = 0 \). Moreover, in this setting, the demand and supply of assets are
\[
D(p) = \left[ 1 - a_p^I \right] \pi \left( 1 - \frac{p}{\eta} \right),
\]
and
\[
S(p) = (1 - \pi) \int_{a_p^I(p)}^1 ada.
\]
It is straightforward to show that the results of the analysis carry through in this modified setting if \( \rho \) is not too large.

C Further Extensions

C.1 Extension: lender has control over success probability

The reader could wonder what would be the working of the model if the lender exerted control over the probability of success of the technologies, rather than over the probability of occurrence of an innovation opportunity. In this supplementary section, we consider an alternative scenario in which the lender has influence over the success probability of the two technologies. We are interested in capturing a similar trade-off as that present in the baseline model. We then posit that the lender can undertake an action that raises the probability of success of the new technology, at the cost of reducing the probability of success of the mature technology. In particular, by undertaking the action the lender increases the probability that an innovation plan adopted on date 1 turns out to be viable on date 2 (e.g., that an R&D effort is successful in generating the opportunity to innovate), but reduces the probability that the retention of the mature technology is viable. If the (mature of new) technology turns out to be not viable, then it fails with certainty.

Specifically, let \( \kappa_n \) (respectively, \( \kappa_m \)) denote the probability that the new (mature) technology is viable. Conditional on a technology being viable, the project succeeds with probability \( \pi \) or fails with probability \( 1 - \pi \), and the assets get liquidated; if instead the technology is not viable, it fails with certainty and the assets get liquidated but are unrecoverable. In case the lender does not undertake the action, the probability of viability of the mature technology is \( \kappa_H \), while that of the new technology is \( \kappa_L < \kappa_L \). If instead the lender undertakes the action, the probability of viability of the new and the mature technology are both equal to \( \kappa \), with \( \kappa_L < \kappa < \kappa_H \).

In this modified scenario, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) of the lender becomes
\[
(1 - \sigma) \kappa \pi r_n^I + (1 - \sigma)(1 - \kappa)^*0 + \sigma \kappa [\pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \rho_a] + \sigma(1 - \kappa)^*0 
\geq (1 - \sigma) \pi \kappa L r_n^I + (1 - \sigma)(1 - \kappa L)^*0 + \sigma \kappa H [\pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \rho_a] + \sigma(1 - \kappa H)^*0,
\]
which can be rewritten as
\[
(1 - \sigma) \kappa \pi r_n^I + \sigma \kappa [\pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \rho_a] \geq (1 - \sigma) \pi \kappa L r_n^I + \sigma \kappa H [\pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \rho_a].
\]

The participation constraint of the lender becomes
\[
(1 - \sigma) \kappa \pi r_n^I + \sigma \kappa [\pi r_m^I + \lambda(1 - \pi)\mu^I \rho_a] \geq i,
\]
\[25\]The maintenance effort becomes \( \mu^I = \frac{(1 - \sigma)(1 - \lambda)\kappa}{\zeta} \), and \( \mu^I \rho_a = \frac{(1 - \sigma)(1 - \lambda)\kappa \rho_H}{\zeta} \).
that is,
\[(1 - \sigma)\kappa \pi r^I_n + \sigma \kappa \pi r^I_m + \frac{\lambda(1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi)\sigma^2 \kappa^2 p a}{\zeta} \geq i.\]

The IC of the lender can be rewritten as
\[(1 - \sigma) (\kappa - \kappa^L) r^I_n - \sigma \pi (\kappa^H - \kappa) r^I_m \geq \frac{\lambda(1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi)\sigma^2 \kappa^2 p a [(\kappa^H)^2 - \kappa^2]}{\zeta}.

To simplify the algebra, we assume that
\[(1 - \sigma)(\kappa - \kappa^L) = \sigma (\kappa^H - \kappa).

Then, the IC simplifies to
\[\pi (r^I_n - r^I_m) = \frac{\lambda(1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi)\sigma p a (\kappa^H + \kappa)}{\zeta}.

Using the modified IC and PC, we can solve for the $a^A(p)$ and $\bar{a}(p)$ thresholds in this setting
\[a^A(p) = \frac{\zeta [i - \pi \kappa l y (1 + n - \sigma n)]}{\lambda(1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi)^2 \sigma^2 \kappa^2 p},\]
\[\bar{a}(p) = \frac{\zeta [\pi \kappa l y (1 + n) - i]}{\lambda(1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi)^2 \sigma^2 \kappa^H p}.

Moreover, in this setting the demand and supply of assets are
\[D(p) = \left[1 - a^A(p)\right] \kappa \pi \left(1 - \frac{p}{\eta \theta}\right), \quad S(p) = (1 - \pi) \kappa \int_{a^A(p)}^{\bar{a}} ada.

It is straightforward to show that the results of the analysis carry through in this modified setting.

### C.2 Extension: effect of a drop in $\pi$

In this supplementary section, we consider a shock alternative to that considered in the main text. In particular, we posit a drop in the probability $\pi$ of project success. We first analyze the effect of such shock on the asset price $p$. The excess demand of assets is
\[D(p) - S(p) = \left[1 - a^A(p)\right] \kappa \pi \left(1 - \frac{p}{\eta \theta}\right) - \frac{(1 - \pi) \left(1 + a^A(p)\right)}{2}.

Denote the term in the bracket as $F(\pi, p)$:
\[F(\pi, p) = \pi \left(1 - \frac{p}{\eta \theta}\right) - \frac{(1 - \pi) \left(1 + a^A(p)\right)}{2} = \pi \left(1 - \frac{p}{\eta \theta}\right) - \frac{1}{2} (1 - \pi) \left[1 + \frac{\zeta [i - \pi l y (1 + n - \sigma^A n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda) p}\right].

The equilibrium price $p^*$ is a function of $\pi$ and satisfies $F(\pi, p^*(\pi)) = 0$. We obtain,
\[\frac{\partial F}{\partial \pi} = -\frac{1}{\eta \theta} + \frac{1}{2} \left[1 - \frac{\zeta [i - \pi l y (1 + n - \sigma^A n)]}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi)^2 \lambda (1 - \lambda) p} + \frac{l y (1 + n - \sigma^A n)}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda) p}\right] = -\frac{1}{\eta \theta} + \frac{1}{2} \left[1 - a^A(p) + \frac{l y (1 + n - \sigma^A n)}{(\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi) \lambda (1 - \lambda) p}\right].\]
Because $1 - \frac{p^*}{\eta \theta} > 0$, $1 - a^{IA}(p^*) > 0$, and $1 + n - \sigma^A n > 0$, we have $\frac{\partial F(\pi, p^*)}{\partial \pi} > 0$. Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial p} = \frac{1}{p} \left[ -\frac{\pi p}{\eta \theta} + \frac{(1 - \pi) a^{IA}(p)}{2} \right] = \frac{1}{p} \left( -\frac{2\pi p}{\eta \theta} + \frac{3\pi - 1}{2} \right).$$

Because $p^* > \frac{\eta \theta 3\pi - 1}{2\pi}$ according to equation (4), $\frac{\partial F}{\partial p}(\pi, p^*) < 0$. As a result, using the implicit function theorem,

$$\frac{dp^*}{d\pi} = \frac{\frac{\partial F}{\partial \pi}(\pi, p^*)}{\frac{\partial F}{\partial p}(\pi, p^*)} > 0.$$

This shows that, as a result of a drop in $\pi$, the asset price drops. We next study the effect on the measure of firms obtaining credit $C = 1 - a^{IA}(p^*)$ and the measure of innovative firms $N = a(p^*) - a^{IA}(p^*)$ (assuming equation (5) holds). The effect of a decrease in $\pi$ on $C$ is given by

$$\frac{dC}{d\pi} = \frac{\zeta (\sigma^A)^2 (1 - \pi)^3 \lambda (1 - \lambda)}{(1 + n - \sigma^A n) (1 + \pi) + [i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A n)] (1 - \pi) \frac{dp^*/d\pi}{p^*} - 2i}.$$

Next, we look at the effect on the measure of innovative firms:

$$\frac{dN}{d\pi} = \frac{\zeta (\sigma^A)^2 \sigma^A (1 - \pi)^3 \lambda (1 - \lambda) p^*}{(1 + n - \sigma^A n) (1 + \pi) + [i - \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A n)] (1 - \pi) \frac{dp^*/d\pi}{p^*} - 2i} \left\{ -2 \left( \sigma^{A + \bar{A}} \right) i + \left[ \sigma^A (1 + n) + \sigma^{A + \bar{A}} (1 + n - \sigma^A n) \right] \sigma^A (1 + \pi) 
- \left[ \sigma^A \pi ly(1 + n) + \sigma^{A + \bar{A}} \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A n) \right] \pi (1 + \pi) \frac{dp^*/d\pi}{p^*} \right\}.$$  

$$\frac{dN}{d\pi} < 0$$ if and only if

$$-2 \left( \sigma^{A + \bar{A}} \right) i + \left[ \sigma^A (1 + n) + \sigma^{A + \bar{A}} (1 + n - \sigma^A n) \right] \sigma^A (1 + \pi) 
- \left[ \sigma^A \pi ly(1 + n) + \sigma^{A + \bar{A}} \pi ly(1 + n - \sigma^A n) \right] \pi (1 + \pi) \frac{dp^*/d\pi}{p^*} < 0.$$  

It is immediate to grasp the mechanisms at work from inspection of the above formulas. In particular, the drop in $\pi$ exerts a downward pressure on the asset price, and this tends to increase the measure of innovative firms $N$ by raising the $\bar{a}(p^*)$ threshold. On the other hand, a drop in $\pi$ makes projects more likely to fail thus raising the weight on assets in the incentive compatibility constraint of lenders. This effect tends to reduce the measure of innovative firms by reducing the $\bar{a}(p^*)$ threshold. Finally, the measure of innovative firms is also affected by the shift in the $a^{IA}(p^*)$ threshold.

### D Numerical Experiments

In this supplementary section, we develop some numerical experiments that help further grasp the intuition behind the results of the model.
D.1 A numerical example

In Table S.1 we present a parameterization for the baseline model. Under this parameterization, Assumptions 1-3 hold, and case (ii) of Proposition 1 is realized (i.e., condition (5) does not hold). The choice of these parameters is illustrative. For example, there is not an obvious way to define the counterpart of a “period” in our model (a period may correspond to the length of an innovation project which can entail multiple years).

Table S.1: Value of Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of project success</td>
<td>$\pi$ 0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output of mature technology</td>
<td>$y$ 1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity edge of new technology</td>
<td>$n$ 0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral assets of firm</td>
<td>$a$ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment outlay of project</td>
<td>$i$ 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of verifiable output</td>
<td>$l$ 0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of innovation opportunity if lender facilitates</td>
<td>$1 - \sigma^A$ 0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of innovation opportunity if lender hinders</td>
<td>$1 - \bar{\sigma}^A$ 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate productivity liquidated assets</td>
<td>$\eta$ 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum idiosyncratic productivity liquidated assets</td>
<td>$\bar{\theta}$ 2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lender’s bargaining power in renegotiation</td>
<td>$\lambda$ 0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance cost of collaterals</td>
<td>$\zeta$ 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lender’s endowment</td>
<td>$\omega$ -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table S.2 shows the baseline result:

Table S.2: Numerical Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline value 2.01</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage change -1.05</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The first row shows the value of variables under baseline parameterization. The second row shows the percentage change when there is a one percent decline in $\eta$.

D.2 Validity of equation 5

Using the parameterization in Table S.1, we next assess under what conditions the scenario in which a negative collateral shock can foster innovation is more likely. In particular, Figure S.1 below shows the boundary on $\eta^\bar{\theta}$ implied by equation 5 as parameters vary. Recall from Propositions 1 and 2 that a higher boundary on $\eta^\bar{\theta}$ implies that the scenario in which a collateral squeeze stimulates innovation is less likely (because it is more likely that all firms with access to credit can innovate, that is, collateral-rich firms do not face lenders’ technological inertia). Note also that $\eta^\bar{\theta}$ does not enter other assumptions made in the model and that, for the range of parameters in the graphs, all other assumptions made in the model still hold.
The intuition for the results in Figure S.1 is as follows. Consider first the output verifiability \( l \). The larger is \( l \), the easier it is to pledge output to a lender and to satisfy the lender’s incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, the boundary on \( \eta \bar{\theta} \) below which collateral-rich firms do not face lenders’ technological inertia is higher. Consider next the probability of project success \( \pi \). When \( \pi \) is higher, the liquidation value of assets has lower weight in the incentive compatibility constraint of the lender. As a result, it is easier to induce lenders to undertake the action that favors innovation. Thus, the boundary on \( \eta \bar{\theta} \) below which collateral-rich firms do not face lenders’ technological inertia is higher. As for the impact of \( n \), for a higher \( n \) it is easier to pledge output to a lender and to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of the lender. Therefore, the boundary on \( \eta \bar{\theta} \) below which collateral-rich firms do not face lenders’ technological inertia is higher. Finally, the higher is the lender’s bargaining power \( \lambda \), the lower is the collateral maintenance of the entrepreneur, and again it is easier to pledge output to a lender and satisfy the lender’s incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, the boundary on \( \eta \bar{\theta} \) below which collateral-rich firms do not face lenders’ technological inertia is higher.

D.3 Sensitivity of main results

In Figure S.2 below we show how the effects of a one-percent decrease in \( \eta \) change as key parameters of the model vary. We focus on the measure of firms with access to credit, the measure of innovative firms, the asset price and output.

The intuition for the results can be provided as follows. The larger are \( l \) and \( \pi \), the larger is the weight on the repayment in case of success and the lower is the weight on collateral asset values in the incentive compatibility constraint of the lenders. Therefore, when the collateral shock occurs, the impact on the asset price is milder and, as a result, the drop in the measure of firms with access to credit, and the increase in the measure of firms that innovate, are also smaller. The impact on output is overall smaller (the smaller drop in the measure of active firms dominates over the smaller increase in the measure of innovative firms). A similar outcome can be observed when \( n \) is higher. The larger is \( n \), the larger is the weight on the repayment in case of success and the lower is the...
weight on collateral asset values in the incentive compatibility constraint of the lenders. Therefore, when the shock occurs the impact on the asset price is milder and thus the drop in the measure of firms with access to credit, and the increase in the measure of firms that innovate, are smaller. The impact on output is overall smaller (the smaller drop in the measure of active firms dominates over the smaller increase in the measure of innovative firms). However, observe that in this case, when \( n \) is higher, while there is a smaller increase in the measure of innovative firms following the shock, their return from innovation is higher. Finally, in the case of lenders’ bargaining power \( \lambda \), two effects compete with each other. A lower \( \lambda \) reduces lenders’ appropriation of collateral value but also boosts entrepreneurs appropriation and, hence, entrepreneurs’ collateral maintenance. The numerical experiment shows that overall the impact on output and the measure of innovative firms is smaller when \( \lambda \) is lower.

### D.4 Effect of policies

Figure S.3 below shows how the boundary on \( \eta \tilde{\theta} \) in equation (5) below which all firms with access to credit can innovate changes depending on the extent of policy interventions (transfer \( \tau \) in case of asset market interventions; \( a_{GT} \) threshold in case of direct lending policy). As noted in the main text, the policies tend to reduce the bound, thus slowing down the innovation of collateral-rich firms. Figure S.4 shows that the baseline parameters are in the region where direct lending increases output \( Y \) and the measure of innovative firms \( N \), while asset purchases reduce \( Y \) and \( N \). The numerical experiment thus shows that the asset market policy is indeed more taxing for innovators than the direct lending policy.
Figure S.3: The bounds on $\eta\bar{\theta}$ implied by equation (7) and (9). The x-axes are percentage points. Direct lending is defined as $a^{IA} - a_G$.

Figure S.4: The effect of a one-percent decline in $\eta$, as the policy response $\tau$ or direct lending varies. Direct lending is defined as $a^{IA} - a_G$. The values of $\tau$ and direct lending are in percentage points.
## Table S.3: Robustness Tests. Alternative Proxies; Role of Collateral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probit (1)</th>
<th>Probit (2)</th>
<th>Probit (3)</th>
<th>Probit (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth fixed assets</strong></td>
<td>0.082*</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.159**</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assets &gt; median (dummy)</td>
<td>0.225***</td>
<td>0.222***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II quartile of tot ass. (dummy)</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III quartile of tot ass. (dummy)</td>
<td>0.222***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.250***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV quartile of tot ass. (dummy)</td>
<td>0.285***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.295***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth fixed ass. * (Tot ass.&gt;median)</td>
<td>-0.166**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.183**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth * II q. tot ass.</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth * III q. tot ass.</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.205***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth * IV q. tot ass.</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.167*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on collateral</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations:** 4171  4171  6714  6714

*Note:* This table reports supplementary robustness tests for the baseline results of Table 1. In particular, we reestimate the baseline regressions of columns 5-6 and 11-12 of Table 1 by also controlling for the bank's emphasis on collateral, as declared by the respondent firms. See Appendix A for more details on the variables. All the columns report the coefficients and all the regressions include industry and country fixed effects. For the list of other controls, not indicated in this table to conserve space, refer to Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table S.4: Robustness Tests. Gambling for Resurrection Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (A) Correlations between Exit and Innovation</th>
<th>Table (B) Correlations between Solvency and Non-marginal Innovation in 2008-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Assets &lt; median</strong></td>
<td><strong>Z score &lt; median</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit by 2011</td>
<td>Exit by 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in Innovations in 2008-2009</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.9923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start or Accelerate Non-marginal Innovations in 2008-2009</td>
<td>-0.0189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.1764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms with Total Assets &lt; median</td>
<td>0.0245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.3336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms with Z score &lt; median</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms with Solvency ratio 2011</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.0240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms with Solvency ratio 2012</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.9807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (C) Regressing Exit and Solvency ratio on Innovation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Assets &lt; median</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit by 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in Innovations in 2008-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start or Accelerate Non-marginal Innovations in 2008-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Country dummies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table reports supplementary robustness tests for the baseline results of Table 1. In Panel A, we report correlations between the proxy for firm exit by the years 2011 and 2012 and the measures of innovation for firms with signs of distress in 2008 (as captured by a low Z-score or low availability of collateralizable assets). In Panel B, we report correlations between the firm’s solvency ratio in the years 2011 and 2012 and firm innovation for firms with signs of distress in 2008 (as captured by a low Z-score or low availability of collateralizable assets). In Panel C of the table, for firms with signs of distress, we report coefficient estimates of regressions of the proxies for firm exit and solvency in 2011 on the measures of innovation and on industry and country fixed effects. See Appendix A for more details on the variables. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Figure S.5: Joint distribution of collateralizable assets and innovation