Polarization, Antipathy, and Political Activism*

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Abstract

We apply an evolutionary game theory model to explain polarization, antipathy, and political activism as a consequence of the co-evolution of individuals’ ideologies and attitudes toward other ideologies. We show that the evolutionary process results in a vicious cycle with individuals becoming increasingly polarized on the ideological spectrum and the society ending up with two politically engaged groups sharing no common grounds and strong hatred against each other.

Keywords: Polarization, Antipathy, Political activism, Value formation, Cultural transmission, Evolutionary game theory.

JEL Codes: C73, Z13.

1 Introduction

The ongoing American culture war is dividing the country to an unprecedented level. Recent reports issued by Pew Research Center (2014, 2016, 2017, 2019) identify three major trends in the evolution of Americans’ ideologies. First, a growing proportion of the population holds extreme ideological views. From 1994 to 2014, the proportion of Americans in the tails of the ideological distribution—consistent liberals or consistent conservatives—has increased from 10% to 23%, and the center has shrunk from 49% to 38% (Figure 1(a)). Second, antipathy has been growing between people holding different ideological views. In 2016, 58% (55%) of Republicans (Democrats) had very unfavorable impressions of the Democratic Party (GOP), while the two percentages

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were only 21% and 17% in 1994 (Figure 1(b)). The American National Election Studies look at a longer time span and show that Americans’ negative feelings toward opposing parties has been consistently growing for the last 50 years. Third, those with more extreme ideologies and more unfavorable opinions of the opposing party are more politically engaged. 58% (31%) of consistent liberals and 78% (26%) of consistent conservatives always vote (contribute to political candidate or group), compared to 43% (12%), 39% (8%), and 58% (26%) of moderate liberals, centrists, and moderate conservatives, respectively (Figure 1(c)). Compared to those who have mostly unfavorable opinions, Democrats (Republicans) who have very unfavorable opinions of the Republic (Democratic) Party are 12% (18%) more likely to always vote, 12% (9%) more likely always vote in primaries, and in the past two years more likely to contact an elected official, make donation to a campaign, attend a campaign event, and work/volunteer for a campaign (Figure 1(d)).

Aforementioned evidence suggests that Americans have been increasingly polarized on the ideological spectrum, and moreover, their antipathy toward those situated on the opposite end

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1Similarly, 72% (53%) of consistent conservatives (liberals) had strong negative sentiments toward the Democratic party (GOP) in 2014, while the two percentages were 28% and 23% in 1994. Ideological thinking has become much more closely aligned with partisanship: The percentages of Republicans and Democrats holding more extreme values than the median member of the opposing party were 95% and 97% in 2017 and 93% and 94% in 2015, but only 64% and 70% in 1994.
of the spectrum has been growing stronger. At the same time, they are more politically engaged than people close to the center. In this paper, we attempt to model the co-evolution of ideologies and attitudes toward other ideologies, and provide an explanation for the increasing polarization, antipathy and political activism in the United States.

We reinterpret the classic intergenerational cultural transmission model of Bisin and Verdier (2001) as a dynamic ideology formation model. Individuals in a large society are continuously forming their ideologies. An individual naturally has antipathy (Bisin and Verdier (2001) use the term “cultural intolerance”) toward others who hold a different ideology. Hence, she has an incentive to maintain her current ideology by exerting an effort. One can interpret the effort as the time she spends on watching news aligned with her ideology, interacting with like-minded people, and actively participating in other political activities. However, she cannot completely shut herself off from outside influences, but the higher effort she exerts, the smaller the impact she receives from the society at large. Aggregating the changes in individuals’ ideologies, we obtain a dynamic process describing the evolution of the distribution of ideologies in the society.

We show that the key for the emergence of ideological polarization is that an individual’s antipathy toward another individual is increasing and convex in the distance between their ideological positions. That is, people are increasingly more intolerant toward others holding more distanced views from them. Because of this, people situated on both ends of the ideological spectrum have a stronger incentive to be more politically engaged to maintain their ideologies than those close to the center, which drives the center to shrink and the tails to grow. When antipathy is instead concave, diversification emerges as the stable prediction of the dynamic.

Empirical evidence suggests that the American society is becoming more polarized, which matches our model’s prediction under convex antipathy. The question is, why is antipathy convex? To answer this question, we further generalize the model to treat antipathy as an endogenous trait. In other words, individuals’ ideologies and their antipathy toward others are simultaneously evolving. We show that strong (convex) antipathy eliminates weak (concave) antipathy and at the same time drives ideologies to the extremes. Therefore, convex antipathy is a result of selection through the dynamic process of ideology formation. This also matches the fact that antipathy is growing stronger between the two extremes in the American society.

We contribute to the literature on cultural transmission (see Bisin and Verdier (2011) for a

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2 We distinguish polarization and antipathy, in contrast to Iyengar et al. (2012) who define antipathy as an alternative definition of polarization.

3 In the literature of spatial voting models starting from Hotelling (1929), Black (1948) and Downs (1957), most papers consider that agents have single-peaked concave utility functions over political ideologies, which can be translated into convex antipathy in our model.
survey). First, to our limited knowledge, the model by Bisin and Verdier (2001) has not been used to understand the American cultural war. Second, although Wu and Cheung (2018) have shown that convex cultural intolerance leads to polarization in a continuous model, they can only show it by assuming symmetry and cannot obtain concrete predictions when cultural intolerance is instead concave due to technical limitations. We instead assume that there is a finite number of ideological traits following Bisin et al. (2009) and Montgomery (2010), which allows us to utilize the techniques from conventional evolutionary game theory to obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions under which polarization can arise (or not) as well as what the predictions would be when antipathy is concave in ideologies. Finally, in the literature of cultural transmission, cultural intolerance (antipathy in our terms) is usually not an evolving trait. We endogenize antipathy and show how it co-evolves with ideology and relates to political activism.

Political scientists have been studying political polarization for decades (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Sides and Hopkins, 2015). See Layman et al. (2006) for a thorough survey on the literature. The literature has categorized political polarization into party polarization and popular popularization and debated about the causal relationship between the two; See Hunter (1991), Frank (2004), and Fiorina et al. (2005) for book treatments on the topic of popular popularization. One view suggests that the growing ideological divergence on the electorate level causes polarization among the political elites. Another view instead argues that the mass public has a lower level of attention to and knowledge about politics. Hence, the elites are the more likely culprit. A third view supported by Layman et al. (2006) considers the political activists as a main spring of party polarization. They argue that the ideologically more extreme individuals are more politically engaged. As the grassroots-level opinion leaders, these individuals can exert considerable influences on party politics. Although our model mainly focuses on the popular level of political polarization, our results on increasing political activism by those holding more extreme views provide support for the third view. Alternative mathematical models based on Bayesian updating (Dixit and Weibull, 2007) and network theory (Marvela et al., 2011; Bolletta and Pin, 2020) are also proposed to explain political polarization. However, these researches fail to demonstrate the interlinks between polarization, antipathy and political activism as we do.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic dynamic ideology formation model. Section 3 generalizes the model to include antipathy as an evolving trait. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Dynamic Ideology Formation Model

A unit mass of agents constitutes a population. Each agent has an ideological trait from set $T = \{L, C, R\}$, where $L$ represents the liberal left, $R$ represents the conservative right, and $C$ represents the center. The population state can be described by a vector in $\mathbb{R}^3$, $x = (x_L, x_C, x_R)$, with $x_L + x_C + x_R = 1$, and the collection of the population states is a simplex denoted by $X$.

At each time $t$, agents in the population are selected uniformly randomly, and the selected agent will receive an impact from the society, which may influence her ideology. The agent can exert an effort to limit herself from the outside influences. The higher effort she exerts, the higher is the probability that she can maintain her ideology. However, there is always a chance that she fails. In this case, she will be affected randomly by another agent in the society.

Now let us consider the effort choice of an agent with ideology $a \in T$. Let $e_a \in \mathbb{R}^+$ denote her effort. Define $d : \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$ as the probability of success function, where $d(e_a)$ is the probability that she successfully resists the outside influences given that she exerts an effort of $e_a$. Assume that $d(0) = 0$, $d' > 0$ and $d'' \leq 0$. Let $c : \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ be the cost function of effort. Assume that $c(0) = 0$, $c'(0) = 0$, $c' \geq 0$ and $c'' > 0$. For simplicity, we will adopt the commonly used functional form in the literature for $d$ and $c$: $d(e) := e$ and $c(e) := e^2/2$.

Let $V_{ab}$ denote the subjective assessment of an agent with ideology $a \in T$ of her utility if she changes her ideology to $b \in T$. Assume that $V_{aa} > V_{ab}$ for any $b \in T \setminus \{a\}$. This reflects that an agent always believes that she is better off by maintaining her current ideology. We normalize $V_{ab}$ to be between $[0, 1]$ for all $a, b \in T$. Let $\Delta_{ab} := V_{aa} - V_{bb}$ denote the antipathy of an agent with ideology $a \in T$ toward ideology $b \in T$. Observe that $\Delta_{aa} = 0$ for any $a \in T$ and we have $\Delta_{ab} \in (0, 1]$ for any $a \neq b$ and $a, b \in T$. Hence, an agent holds no animosity toward those sharing the same ideology with her in the society, but has negative sentiments toward the rest.

Given a population state $x$, an agent with ideology $a \in T$ tries to maximize her utility by taking into account the possibility that she may successfully maintain her own ideology and the possibility that she fails to do so and gets influenced by others in the society. The maximization problem for any agent with an ideology $a \in T$ is given as follows:

$$
\max_{e_a} e_a V_{aa} + (1 - e_a)(x_a V_{aa} + x_b V_{ab} + x_c V_{ac}) - \frac{1}{2} e_a^2,
$$

(1)

4The model can be easily generalized to more than three traits to include moderate ideologies. Nevertheless, the three-trait model is sufficient to deliver our main theoretical insights.

5Socialization effort is arguably a more important factor than inheritance in determining one’s partisan and ideological identity: “Just 31% of Democrats cite long-standing ties with the party—‘ever since I can remember I’ve been a Democrat’—as a major reason for identifying with the party. Even fewer Republicans (23%) cite this as a major reason they belong to the GOP.” (Pew Research Center, 2016, Page 20)
for \( b, c \in T \setminus \{a\} \) and \( b \neq c \). If she exerts effort \( e_a \), with probability \( e_a \), she successfully resists outside influences and maintains her ideology; and with probability \( 1 - e_a \), she fails to do so and randomly switches to a new ideology according to population distribution of ideologies. The optimal solution is given by \( e_a^*(x) = x_b \Delta_{ab} + x_c \Delta_{ac} \), which equals the weighted antipathy she has toward the other two ideologies. Hence, her optimal effort increases in the proportion of agents with different ideologies and in her antipathy toward them.

The evolutionary dynamic of the distribution of ideologies in the society is characterized by the following system of differential equations:

\[
\dot{x}_a = x_b (1 - e_b) x_a + x_c (1 - e_c) x_a - x_a (1 - e_a) (1 - x_a),
\]

for any \( a \in T, b, c \in T \setminus \{a\} \), and \( b \neq c \). \( \dot{x}_a \) is the rate of change in the mass of agents with ideology \( a \). The first two terms on the RHS of the dynamic is the “inflow” of agents with non-\( a \) ideologies who switch to ideology \( a \), and the last term is the “outflow” of agents with ideology \( a \) who switch to non-\( a \) ideologies.

To further understand the evolutionary dynamic, we utilize the insight of Montgomery (2010) that it is essentially equivalent to a replicator dynamic (RD) by Taylor and Jonker (1978) on a population game. More specifically, consider a population of agents who are randomly matched in pairs to play a two-player 3-by-3 symmetric game with strategy set \( T \) (coinciding with the set of ideologies) and the antipathy \( \Delta_{ab} \) is the single match payoff of an agent playing strategy \( a \) against an opponent playing strategy \( b \). The game is given as follows in Table 1.

Table 1: Two-players 3-by-3 symmetric game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>L</strong></td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>( \Delta_{LC}, \Delta_{CL} )</td>
<td>( \Delta_{LR}, \Delta_{RL} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>( \Delta_{CL}, \Delta_{LC} )</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>( \Delta_{CR}, \Delta_{RC} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong></td>
<td>( \Delta_{LR}, \Delta_{RL} )</td>
<td>( \Delta_{RC}, \Delta_{CR} )</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Define \( F_a(\mu) := \sum_{b \in T} \Delta_{ab} \) as the expected payoff of an agent playing strategy \( a \) for any \( a \in T \). The evolutionary dynamic can be rewritten as:

\[
\dot{x}_a = x_a \left[ F_a(x) - \sum_{b \in T} x_b F_b(x) \right] \text{ for any } a \in T,
\]

which is exactly the replicator dynamic.
We are interested in how antipathy affects the trajectory of the evolution of ideology. To obtain meaningful analytic results, we impose the specific payoff structure for Table 1 (we only show Player 1’s payoffs given symmetry of the game) in Table 2.

Table 2: Antipathy as an increasing function of ideological difference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>L</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>R</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>ah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>bh</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assume that \( h > 0, \alpha > 1 \) and \( \beta > 1 \). The payoff structure captures that antipathy increases in ideological difference and allows asymmetry in antipathy between the two extreme ideologies L and R. We have the following result:

**Proposition 1.**

1. If \((\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) \geq 1\), every trajectory in the interior of \( X \) converges to the state \((x_L^*, x_C^*, x_R^*) = (\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}, 0, \frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta})\).

2. If \((\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) < 1\), every trajectory in the interior of \( X \) converges to the state \((x_L^*, x_C^*, x_R^*) = (\frac{\alpha+\beta-\alpha\beta}{2\alpha+2\beta-\alpha\beta}, \frac{\beta}{2\alpha+2\beta-\alpha\beta})\).

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

Proposition 1 characterizes all the globally stable states of the evolutionary dynamic. There are several immediate implications.

First, when \( \alpha \geq 2 \) and \( \beta \geq 2 \), that is, agents with ideology L and R have convex antipathy \((\Delta_{LR} \geq 2\Delta_{LC}, \Delta_{RL} \geq 2\Delta_{RC})\), \( x_C^* = 0 \). Hence, convex antipathy is a sufficient condition for the rise of polarization. The rationale is as follows. Because antipathy is increasing and convex, agents with ideology L or R have a higher incentive to maintain their ideology by exerting higher efforts (being more politically engaged) than those with ideology C. Hence, \( x_C \) always decreases and \( x_L + x_R \) always increases along the evolutionary trajectory.

Second, when \( \alpha, \beta \in (1,2) \), that is, agents with ideology L and R have strictly concave antipathy, all three ideologies are in the support of the stable state. Hence, concave antipathy leads to diversification.

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6Here global stability of a population state means that every trajectory in the interior of \( X \) converges to the state. If the initial state is on the boundaries of \( X \), i.e., one of the ideologies is initially "zeroed out", the dynamic cannot leave that edge because of the special property of the replicator dynamic.
In Case 1 of Proposition 1, we have $m_G > 0, m_U < 0$, implying that if the antipathy toward ideology $R$ for the agents with ideology $L$ is stronger, the proportion of agents with ideology $L$ increases and the proportion of agents with ideology $R$ decreases. In Case 2 of Proposition 1, we have $m_G > 0, m_U < 0, m_G' \leq (>) 0$ if $\beta \leq (>) 2$. Hence, when the antipathy toward ideology $R$ for the agents with ideology $L$ is stronger, the proportion of agents with ideology $L$ increases and the proportion of agents with ideology $C$ decreases. The comparative statics for $x_R^*$ with respect to $\alpha$ depends on the value of $\beta$. In particular, when $\beta > 2$, $x_R^*$ increases in $\alpha$.

We provide some graphic illustrations of the evolutionary dynamic in difference cases ($h = 0.05$ across all cases) by utilizing the software Dynamo (Franchetti and Sandholm, 2013) in Figure 2. Hollow dots represent the unstable rest points and solid dots represent the stable states. The arrows represent the trajectories of the evolutionary dynamic. The different colors of shades in the figures represent different speeds of the dynamic. Warmer colors are associated with faster speeds. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show that convex antipathy leads to polarization and concave antipathy leads to diversification, respectively.

Figures 2(c) and 2(d) characterize cases in which the antipathy of agents with ideology $L$ is convex and the antipathy of agents with ideology $R$ is strictly concave. Figures 2(c) shows that all three ideologies still coexist and $L$ is the majority when $L$’s antipathy toward $R$ is not too strong comparing to $R$’s antipathy toward $L$. Figure 2(d) implies that as $R$’s antipathy becomes more concave ($\beta \downarrow 1$), we need $L$’s antipathy become much more convex (at the same time, its antipathy toward $R$ becomes much stronger) to maintain polarization.

3 The Co-evolution of Ideology and Attitude

In this section, we generalize the previous model to allow agents holding the same ideological position to have different degrees of antipathy. Hence, we have a model describing the co-evolution of ideology and antipathy.

A unit mass of agents constitutes a population. Each agent has a trait from the set $T = \{L_s, L_w, C, R_w, R_s\}$, where $L$, $C$, and $R$ still represent the three different ideologies, the liberal left, the center, and the conservative right, and $s$ and $w$ represent strong and weak antipathy, respectively. Hence, we allow both angry and mild-tempered liberals (conservatives). The population state can be described by a vector in $\mathbb{R}^5$, $x = (x_{L_s}, x_{L_w}, x_C, x_{R_w}, x_{R_s})$, with $x_{L_s} + x_{L_w} + x_C + x_{R_w} + x_{R_s} = 1$. Let $X$ denote the collection of all the population states.

The modeling details are identical to the one described in Section 3. Hence, we skip them and directly focus on the replicator dynamic on the equivalent population game, and we examine the
payoff structure in Table 3.

We make several assumptions on the payoff structure. First, we assume symmetry, that is \( \Delta_{ab} = \Delta_{ba} \) for any \( a, b \in T \).\(^7\) Second, we assume that the liberal lefts (conservative rights) do not have antipathy against each other, i.e., \( \Delta_{iL, iW} = \Delta_{iW, iL} \), for \( i \in \{L, R\} \), which implies that the agents only have antipathy toward those with different ideologies. This assumption helps to simplify the analysis. Relaxing it would not affect the main result as long as one’s antipathy

\(^7\)When a population game has more than three strategies, it is generally impossible to analytically characterize the predictions of the evolutionary dynamic, unless we impose specific properties on the payoff structure. The symmetry assumption imposed makes the game a “double symmetric” game, which is a special case of a potential game (Sandholm, 2001). As one can see from the proof of Proposition 2, a potential game allows us to establish global stability results.
Table 3: Antipathy Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$L_s$</th>
<th>$L_w$</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$R_w$</th>
<th>$R_s$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$L_s$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w C$</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w R_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w R_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w C$</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w R_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta L_w R_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>$\Delta C L_s$</td>
<td>$\Delta C L_w$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\Delta C R_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta C R_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_w$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_w L_s$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_w C$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\Delta R_w R_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_s$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_s$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_s L_s$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_s C$</td>
<td>$\Delta R_s R_w$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

toward another having the same ideology is weaker than her antipathy toward another having a different ideology. Third, we assume that agents with ideology $C$ do not distinguish between $i_s$ and $i_w$, for $i \in \{L, R\}$. Again, this is a simplifying assumption. Relaxing it would not change the main insights. Finally, assume that $\tau \leq \gamma \leq \theta$, with at least one inequality being strict. This assumption guarantees that $s$-type agents have stronger antipathy than $w$-type agents toward those having a different ideology. In addition, assume $\tau > 1$, which assures that antipathy is increasing in ideological difference. We have the following result:

**Proposition 2.** When $\theta > 2$, every trajectory in the interior of $X$ converges to the state $(x^*_L, x^*_w, x^*_C, x^*_R_w, x^*_R_s) = (\frac{1}{2}, 0, 0, 0, \frac{1}{2})$.

**Proof.** See Appendix B. 

Proposition 2 demonstrates that strong antipathy is able to eliminate weak antipathy and when $\theta > 2$, that is, the type-s agents’ antipathy is convex in ideological difference (after eliminating $L_w$ and $R_w$), ideology $C$ is eliminated as well due to its central position, leaving us with $L_s$ and $R_s$ agents equally splitting the population.

We provide some graphic illustrations of the evolutionary dynamic in an numerical example in Figure 3, utilizing the software ABED (Izquierdo et al., 2019). We set $h = 0.05$, $\tau = 2$, $\gamma = 3$, and $\theta = 4$. The initial distribution of traits is $(0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1)$. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) provide the time series of the strategy distributions (population states) and the strategies’ expected payoffs (the efforts exerted by agents with different traits), respectively.

Figure 3(b) shows that the efforts exerted by all agents are monotonically increasing overtime before the dynamic reaches the stable state. In addition, at each time, the efforts of $L_s$ and $R_s$ are larger than those of $L_w$ and $R_w$, which are larger than that of $C$, showing that agents with strong antipathy situated on the left and the right are the most politically active.
Figure 3: Simulations of the evolutionary dynamic.

4 Conclusion

This paper proposes a dynamic model of ideological formation and we show how people’s antipathy toward those different from them ideologically can lead to polarization even in the absence of social changes such as influx of immigration and refugees, increasing income inequality, and growing segregation along the lines of race and socioeconomic classes. Although the current American society has not reached the extreme polarization predicted by our model, the empirical evidence suggests that it is on the right path.

While many blame the traditional media, the social media, the politicians, the party propaganda, or even foreign influences for the current situation in the U.S., we suggest that human nature alone is sufficient to drive us apart.

Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1

For notation convenience, we denote the payoff matrix by

$$
\Gamma := \begin{bmatrix}
0 & h & \alpha h \\
h & 0 & h \\
\beta h & h & 0
\end{bmatrix}.
$$
Let $z = (z_1, z_2, -z_1 - z_2)$ be a displacement vector. We have

$$z' \Gamma z = -h \left[ (\alpha + \beta)z_1^2 + (\alpha + \beta)z_1z_2 + 2z_2^2 \right]$$

$$= -h \left[ (\alpha + \beta)(z_1 + \frac{1}{2}z_2)^2 + (2 - \frac{\alpha + \beta}{4})z_2^2 \right].$$

When $\alpha + \beta \leq 8$, $z' \Gamma z < 0$ as long as $z$ is non zero, which is the defining property of a strictly contractive game (also called the strictly stable game) by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) (see also Sandholm (2010)). According to Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009), a strictly contractive game has a unique Nash equilibrium and every trajectory of the replicator dynamic in the interior of $X$ converges to this unique Nash equilibrium. Hence, the remaining task is to find the Nash equilibrium.

When $(\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) \geq 1$, for $x^* = (x_L^*, x_C^*, x_R^*) = \left( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}, 0, \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta} \right)$, we have $F_L(x^*) = F_R(x^*) > F_C(x^*)$. Hence, it is the unique Nash equilibrium.

When $(\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) < 1$, for $x^* = (x_L^*, x_C^*, x_R^*) = \left( \frac{\alpha}{2\alpha + 2\beta - \alpha \beta}, \frac{\alpha \beta - \alpha + \beta}{2\alpha + 2\beta - \alpha \beta}, \frac{\beta}{2\alpha + 2\beta - \alpha \beta} \right)$, we have $F_L(x^*) = F_C(x^*) = F_R(x^*)$. Hence, it is the unique Nash equilibrium.

When $\alpha + \beta > 8$, we still have the same results on Nash equilibrium in both cases. However, we can no longer use the results for the replicator dynamic on contractive games to study the stability of the Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, we can still establish the global stability results.

First, both the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are negative at the unique Nash equilibrium in both cases. Hence, it is locally stable. Then, for the case $(\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) \geq 1$, we can show that the other 5 rest points (2 on the edges and the 3 vertices) are unstable by utilizing the Jacobian matrix; and for the case $(\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) < 1$, we can show that the other 6 rest points (3 on the edges and the 3 vertices) are unstable. Therefore, we conclude that the unique Nash equilibrium is the uniquely locally stable state in both cases.

Since there is no interior stable state when $(\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) \geq 1$, all trajectories must converge to the boundary of the simplex according to Huntson and Moran (1982). Hence, the unique Nash equilibrium must be globally stable.

Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) show that the replicator dynamic admits no limit cycles when there is an interior locally stable state in 3 by 3 games. Hence, for the case $(\alpha - 1)(\beta - 1) < 1$, the unique Nash equilibrium is globally stable.

The more general results for the replicator dynamic on 3 by 3 games have been exhaustively established in earlier works by Zeeman (1980) and Bomze (1983). Please refer to Montgomery (2010) for a more detailed discussion.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2

We want to show that \((G^*, G^!, B, F, G^!, B, G^!, F, G^!, F, G^!, B) = (\frac{1}{2}, 0, 0, 0, 0, \frac{1}{2})\) is the unique Nash equilibrium. First, suppose \(L_w\) is in the support of a Nash equilibrium \(x\), we must have \(F_L(x) \geq F_L(x)\), which requires \(x_{R_w} = x_{R_s} = 0\). Then we have \(F_{R_w}(x) > F_{L_w}(x)\) and \(F_{R_s}(x) > F_{L_w}(x)\), violating the definition of the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, \(L_w\) cannot be in the support of a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, \(R_w\) cannot be in the support of a Nash equilibrium either.

Second, suppose \(x = (x_{L_s}, 0, x_C, 0, x_{R_s})\) with \(x_C > 0\) is a Nash equilibrium. Then we have \(F_{L_s}(x) = h(x_C + \theta x_{R_s}), F_{R_s}(x) = h(x_C + \theta x_{L_s})\) and \(F_C(x) = h(x_{L_s} + x_{R_s})\). When \(\theta > 2, \frac{1}{2}(F_{L_s}(x) + F_{R_s}(x)) = h(x_c + \frac{\theta}{2}(x_{L_s} + x_{R_s})) > F_C(x)\). Hence, at least one of \(F_{L_s}(x)\) and \(F_{R_s}(x)\) is strictly larger than \(F_C(x)\), which violates the definition of the Nash equilibrium. Hence, we must have \(x_C = 0\). Then it is straightforward to show that \((x_{L_s}^*, x_{L_w}^*, x_C^*, x_{R_w}^*, x_{R_s}^*) = (\frac{1}{2}, 0, 0, 0, \frac{1}{2})\) is a Nash equilibrium, and so it is unique.

Since we assume \(\Delta_{ab} = \Delta_{ba}\), for any \(a, b \in T\), the population game is a potential game for a continuous population of players (Sandholm, 2001). Since there is a unique Nash equilibrium, then every trajectory of the replicator dynamic in the interior of \(X\) converges to this unique Nash equilibrium. The rationale is that when the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, it must be the global maximizer (and also the unique local maximizer) of the potential function of the game, which equals to half of the average payoff \((f(x) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a \in T} x_aF_a(x))\) in our model. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) show that a rest point is stable if and only if it is a local maximizer of the potential function and (Sandholm, 2001) shows that every trajectories converges to some rest points. Since the unique Nash equilibrium is the only stable rest point, every trajectory in the interior of \(X\) converges to it. While the trajectories on the boundaries of the simplex converge to some unstable rest points.

References


